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Algorithmic Parenting
Eldar Haber* and Tammy Harel Ben Shahar**
Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of
interaction with technology. The rise in availability, accessibility,
and use of the internet, along with social norms that encourage internet connection, make it nearly impossible for children to avoid
online engagement. The internet undoubtedly benefits children socially and academically and mastering technological tools at a
young age is indispensable for opening doors to valuable opportunities. However, the internet is risky for children in myriad ways.
Parents and lawmakers are especially concerned with the tension
between important advantages and risks technology bestows on
children.
New technological developments in artificial intelligence are
beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard their
children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and
services can automatically detect when a child’s online behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or when they
are engaging in inappropriate online communication. This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful content in extreme cases. Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article, this
new form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively protect children against digital harms. If designed properly,
algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by
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neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their freedom of speech and access to information.
This Article offers a balanced solution to the parenting dilemma
that allows parents and children to maintain a relationship
grounded in trust and respect, while simultaneously providing a
safety net in extreme cases of risk. In doing so, it addresses the following questions: What laws should govern platforms with respect
to algorithms and data aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect
their children from online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic
parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from
online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or even mandate the use of such algorithms
to protect children? This Article offers a taxonomy of current online
threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers
in making such a transition.
INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 2
I. CHILDREN’S SAFETY ONLINE .................................. 6
II. REGULATING CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ONLINE ... 13
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INTRODUCTION
Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of
interaction with technology. The rise in availability, accessibility,
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and use of the internet, along with social norms that encourage internet connection, makes it nearly impossible for children to avoid
online engagement. The internet undoubtedly benefits children socially and academically, and mastering technological tools at a
young age is indispensable for opening doors to valuable opportunities. However, the internet is risky for children in myriad ways.1
Parents, educators, and policymakers worry that children will be exposed to sexual, violent, or other inappropriate content, or harassed,
bullied, or otherwise harmed. Even absent foul play, internet and
social media use may create risks for children and teens, such as
addiction, a higher tendency toward anxiety and depression, the development of eating disorders, and even suicide.2
Parents and lawmakers are especially concerned with the tension
between important advantages and risks technology bestows on children. As a vulnerable population, children are afforded many forms
of legal protections, both internationally and domestically.3 Parents
are tasked with providing children their basic needs (e.g., food,
clothing, housing, medical care, and education) and protecting them
from physical and mental harm.4 In some instances, the state directly
regulates the protection of children from unnecessary harm, such as
compulsory childhood vaccination laws, abuse-reporting statutes,
and the provision of specific shelters.5 However, other than failed
regulatory attempts to reduce exposure to indecent websites,6 policymakers have focused their attention on protecting the privacy or,
more accurately, preventing datafication of children. The American
regulatory framework under the Children’s Online Privacy
1

See infra Part I.
Id. Notably, this Article generally uses the term children in reference to a variety of
minors, from early childhood (ages three to five) to late adolescence (ages sixteen to
eighteen). The differences between age groups will be discussed throughout the Article as
necessary.
3
See infra Part II.A.
4
See infra Part I.
5
See Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect
Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 324 (2006) (listing legislation that protects children
from harm); Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 381–82 (2004)
(discussing compulsory vaccination laws); BRIAN H. BIX, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO
U.S. LAW: FAMILY LAW 110–17 (2013).
6
See infra Part II.A.
2
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Protection Act (“COPPA”) requires companies to provide adequate
data collection procedures, retention practices, and information accessibility and security, thereby allegedly securing both parents’ and
children’s privacy interests.7
While important, privacy is merely one aspect in which children
require protection. In addition to advising children how to properly
navigate the digital world, many parents opt for more concrete forms
of protection against online risks. Today, the options most available
to parents involve filtering software and limitations on screen time
through either software or house rules.8 Some parents engage in full
parental monitoring—constantly surveilling their children’s online
engagement.9 The array of choices and day-to-day implementations
create a perpetual dilemma for parents regarding the scope of their
children’s autonomy with respect to online activity. Further, parents
are tasked with the challenging choices of when and how to intervene in their children’s online activity to promote their well-being
and protect them from harm.
New technological developments in artificial intelligence (“AI”)
are beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard
their children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and services can automatically detect when a child’s online
behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or
when they are engaging in inappropriate online communication.10
This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful
content in extreme cases.11
Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article,12 this new
form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively
protect children against digital harms. If designed properly, algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their freedom of
speech and access to information. This Article offers a balanced solution to the aforementioned parenting dilemma that allows parents
7
8
9
10
11
12

See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
See infra note 145-50 and accompanying text.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
Id.
See infra Part III.
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and children to maintain a relationship grounded in trust and respect,
while simultaneously providing a safety net in extreme cases of
risk.13 For children who lack meaningful relationships with their
parents or caregivers, algorithms can at least protect against acute
risks by blocking explicit sexual content or alerting parents to content that may suggest the child is contemplating self-harm.14
Despite this appeal, algorithmic parenting poses several challenges that must be discussed and analyzed. In addition to certain
practical complications (e.g., ensuring children do not bypass the
system and detecting implicitly risky behavior), algorithmic parenting must overcome several legal hurdles before such measures can
be implemented. First, algorithmic parenting retains comprehensive
amounts of children’s data, which must be secured. While regulations can somewhat allay this fear, other questions regarding the implementation of algorithmic parenting remain unanswered: What
laws should govern platforms with respect to algorithms and data
aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior
goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect their children from
online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or
even mandate the use of such algorithms to protect children?
This Article offers a taxonomy of current online threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers in making
such a transition. The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces
and discusses the risks and harms that children face today on the
internet. Part II examines potential modalities for regulating children’s protection online. It first discusses the legal regime currently
governing children’s online protection and its limitations. Then, it
turns to non-legal modalities, namely social norms, the market, and
technology, and scrutinizes how parents use technology to monitor
children. Part III describes and evaluates a potential transition toward algorithmic parenting. After discussing the benefits and
13
14

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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drawbacks of algorithmic parenting, Part III then addresses the
state’s role and the legal interventions policymakers must consider
in light of potential drawbacks and effects on children’s rights. Finally, Part IV summarizes the discussion and stresses that, despite
this Article’s endorsement of algorithmic parenting for protecting
children online, algorithmic parenting should never replace open
communication between parents and children.
I. CHILDREN’S SAFETY ONLINE
Children are a vulnerable population in need of special care, assistance, and protection. While children’s capacities evolve as they
gradually gain autonomy over their lives, protecting children from
harm and making decisions on their behalf are two of the most fundamental goals of parenting.15
The online world is an especially challenging arena for parents
to help navigate children’s growth and oversee their safety. The digital world greatly influences children’s lives.16 Children vary, of
course, but connecting to the internet often begins at a very young
age,17 first as passive consumers of online content and then becoming more active as they grow. Teens are often fully integrated online
participants, consuming content independently, using search engines, playing games, communicating with others, participating in

15

See Danielle J. Garber, COPPA: Protecting Children’s Personal Information on the
Internet, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 129, 132 (2001); Dorothy A. Hertzel, Note, Don’t Talk to
Strangers: An Analysis of Government and Industry Efforts to Protect a Child’s Privacy
Online, 52 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 429, 434 (2000); Eldar Haber, Toying with Privacy:
Regulating the Internet of Toys, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 411 (2019). For the principle of the
child’s evolving capacities, see generally Daniel P. Keeting, The Evolving Capacities of
the Child, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: GLOBAL AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 184 (Martin D. Ruck et al. eds., 2017).
16
See, e.g., Jennifer Bremer, The Internet and Children: Advantages and
Disadvantages, 14 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 405, 411–18
(2005); Martin Valcke et al., Internet Parenting Styles and the Impact on Internet Use of
Primary School Children, 55 COMPUTS. & EDUC. 454, 454 (2010).
17
See DONELL HOLLOWAY ET AL., ZERO TO EIGHT: YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR
INTERNET USE 4 (2013); Antigone Davis, Hard Questions: So Your Kids Are Online, But
Will They Be Alright?, FACEBOOK (Dec. 4, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/12/hardquestions-kids-online/ [https://perma.cc/NY4F-SJQD].
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multiple social media networks,18 and uploading original content.19
Given the increased introduction of technology at school, online activity is a necessary component of everyday learning.20
While children have always been exposed to hazards and risks,
the internet dramatically exacerbates the potential for harm.21 Parents and regulators who are not digital natives must be aware of
these new risks and challenges and understand how to appropriately
address them.22 For example, one such danger involves data-mining
children’s viewing habits and using the data for marketing purposes.23 Another threat is potential exposure to harmful content,
such as violent, hateful, commercial, or sexual content.24 Unfortunately, legislators’ attempts to address these concerns and protect
children’s privacy in the face of such practices have proven ineffective.25
From a safety and protection perspective, the gravest risks likely
arise when children transition from passive to active online users.26
Depending on their level of activity and participation online,27
18

See HOLLY BENTLEY ET AL., NAT’L SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILD., HOW SAFE ARE OUR CHILDREN? 3 (2019) (finding that ninety percent of eleven to
sixteen-year-olds surveyed in the UK say they have a social media account).
19
See generally Sonia Livingstone, Maximising Opportunities and Minimising Risks for
Children Online: From Evidence to Policy, 37 INTERMEDIA 50 (2009) (outlining six tenants
to internet safety for children with corresponding policy guidelines).
20
See Yoni Har Carmel & Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar, Reshaping Ability Grouping
Through Big Data, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 103–04 (2017).
21
See JOHN PALFREY ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, ENHANCING CHILD
SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL
TASK FORCE 7 (2008); Sonia Livingstone & Ellen J. Helsper, Parental Mediation of
Children’s Internet Use, 52 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 581, 584 (2008).
22
For a comparison between digital “natives” and digital “immigrants,” see generally
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF
DIGITAL NATIVES (2008).
23
See infra Part II.A. (addressing the regulation of children’s online data further).
24
See Leslie Haddon, Parental Mediation of Internet Use: Evaluating Family
Relationships, in GENERATIONAL USE OF NEW MEDIA 13, 15 tbl.1.1 (Eugène Loos et al.
eds., 2012).
25
See infra Part II.A.
26
Passive use includes consuming content—usually audiovisual content. For young
children, parents or other caregivers direct this use. Active use involves a wide range of
activity, including interaction with others and uploading content.
27
See, e.g., Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in
Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, paras. 59–64 (2000); see also Garber, supra note 15, at
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children begin to experience solicitation,28 harassment,29 and bullying30 and are exposed to more obscene,31 violent,32 and illegal content.33 This easily accessible, online information can vitally influence a child’s development and education. However, with thousands
140–45 (discussing the value of children’s data). A transition to active use also increases
privacy concerns as more information about the child is created. Id.
28
According to San Diego County District Attorney, over 45 million children ages ten
through seventeen use the internet, and among them, one of four encountered unwanted
pornography, one in five had been sexually solicited, and close to sixty percent of teens
have received an email or instant message from a stranger and half have communicated
back.
See
Protecting
Children
Online,
SAN
DIEGO
CNTY.
DIST.
ATT’Y, https://www.sdcda.org/preventing/protecting-children-online/facts-forparents#facts [https://perma.cc/X95H-MZ84]; Sheri Madigan et al., The Prevalence of
Unwanted Online Sexual Exposure and Solicitation Among Youth: A Meta-Analysis, 63 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 133, 137 (2018) (stating one in nine youth experienced unwanted
online sexual solicitation).
29
Online harassment is defined as “rude, threatening or offensive content directed at
others by friends or strangers, through the use of information communications technology.”
May O. Lwin et al., Stop Bugging Me: An Examination of Adolescents’ Protection
Behavior Against Online Harassment, 35 J. ADOLESCENCE 31, 31 (2012).
30
In some instances, bullying could lead to dire outcomes like suicide. Take the case of
Megan Meier as an example—a thirteen-year-old girl who committed suicide after she was
cyberbullied by the mother of a classmate, while believing that it was a sixteen-year-old
boy who lived nearby. See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/
28hoax.html [https://perma.cc/J757-UH2Z]. Interestingly, this case led Rep. Linda
Sanchez (D-CA) to introduce the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,” making
cyberbullying a federal felony. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R.
1966, 111th Cong. (2009). For more on cyberbullying, see generally ROBIN M. KOWALSKI
ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: BULLYING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 46 (2008) (defining cyberbullying
as “bullying through the use of technology such as the Internet and cellular phones”).
31
See Madigan et al., supra note 28, at 137 (stating approximately one in five youth was
exposed to unwanted sexual content).
32
Some platforms block certain content. Facebook, for instance, has mechanisms for
reporting content that does not meet its community’s standards and thus could be removed.
This mechanism, however, has proven only partly helpful, as violent and offensive images
sometimes remain visible for a while or are not removed at all. See Devin Coldewey,
Graphic Video of Suicide Spreads from Facebook to TikTok to YouTube as Platforms Fail
Moderation Test, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 13, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/
09/13/graphic-video-of-suicide-spreads-from-facebook-to-tiktok-to-youtube-asplatforms-fail-moderation-test/ [https://perma.cc/27AE-KLBT].
33
Children might, for instance, be exposed to problematic online “games” that could in
turn drive them into self-harm and even suicide. See David Mikkelson, How Much of a
Threat Is the Purported ‘Momo Challenge’ Suicide Game?, SNOPES (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.snopes.com/news/2019/02/26/momo-challenge-suicide-game/
[https://perma.cc/SVX5-3V55]; see also PALFREY ET AL., supra note 21, at 7.
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of websites discussing different methods of committing suicide34 or
concealing eating disorders,35 it can also be dangerous by discouraging readers from seeking professional help.36 Active online communication also poses the risk that children will engage in inappropriate sexual conduct37 or become vulnerable to various forms of
exploitation, such as having previously-shared content maliciously
repurposed.38 Further, social media “challenges,” particularly on
TikTok, encourage potentially dangerous behavior.39

34

See Adekola O. Alao et al., Cybersuicide: Review of the Role of the Internet on
Suicide, 9 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 489, 490 (2006) (finding over 100,000 websites
discussing different methods of committing suicide and tips for maximum effectiveness
and even posting suicide notes and bulletins and chatrooms in which people receive
encouragement or even engage in suicide pacts). Some websites even block participants
who dissuade others from committing suicide. Research shows that these types of
conversations are especially dangerous for children and adolescents. See Tony Durkee et
al., Internet Pathways in Suicidality: A Review of the Evidence, 8 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. &
PUB. HEALTH 3938, 3938 (2011).
35
See Dina L. G. Borzekowski et al., e-Ana and e-Mia: A Content Analysis of ProEating Disorder Web Sites, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1526, 1531 (2010).
36
See Durkee et al., supra note 34, at 3939; Alao et al., supra note 34, at 490.
37
While this scenario could fit many incidents of children and teens who are sexually
active, there have been some reported incidents of school children engaging in sexual
activities with their teachers, made possible by technology. One such incident involved
Brittany Zamora, a twenty-seven-year-old teacher at an elementary school, who used a
school application to message one of her students, a thirteen-year-old boy, while
exchanging explicit images and text messages. See Nika Shakhnazarova, Twisted Miss:
Predatory Married Teacher Brittany Zamora, 27, ‘Romped with Boy, 13, After Grooming
Him Using Her School’s Own Social Media App,’ SUN (UK) (Jan. 23, 2019, 3:47 PM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8262636/brittany-zamora-married-teacher-romped-boygrooming-school-app [https://perma.cc/Q9NS-V67E].
38
See Tasha Robinson, Black Mirror’s Arkangel Misses Out on So Many Story
Opportunities, VERGE (Jan. 8, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/8/
16864378/black-mirror-arkangel-season-4-jodie-foster-rosemarie-dewitt-review-analysis
[https://perma.cc/J2BV-PPRK].
39
See Italy Blocks TikTok for Certain Users After Death of Girl Allegedly Playing
‘Choking’ Game, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2021, 8:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2021/jan/23/italy-blocks-tiktok-for-certain-users-after-death-of-girl-allegedlyplaying-choking-game [https://perma.cc/B82K-8J6Y]. The “choking challenge,” however,
was not the first reported, dangerous challenge on TikTok. See, e.g., Jane Wakefield,
TikTok Skull Breaker Challenge Danger Warning, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51742854
[https://perma.cc/72TX-57LH];
Maggie O’Neill, Why TikTok’s #StandUpChallenge Is So Dangerous, According to a
Trainer, HEALTH (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.health.com/mind-body/jeanette-jenkinsstand-up-challenge-tiktok [https://perma.cc/P8RC-CQLZ].
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Online activity not only renders children victims of harm, but
also affords children the opportunity to become perpetrators of
harm, as frequently seen in online bullying situations.40 Risks can
also spill over to the physical world when predators obtain information from children that jeopardizes the child’s or family’s safety
and property.41
To add to the alarming number of online risks, internet connectedness is problematic for children even in the absence of malicious,
illegal, or abusive behavior. Research shows that children and adolescents are spending an increasing amount of time on the internet,42
40

See Faye Mishna et al., Cyber Bullying Behaviors Among Middle and High School
Students, 80 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 362, 365 (2010) (noting over one-third of
respondents indicated they had bullied others online).
41
See Sean Gallagher, 12-Year-Old’s Online Life Brings an Abductor to Her Doorstep,
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2014/11/12-year-olds-online-life-brings-an-abductor-to-her-doorstep
[https://perma.cc/DQR2-J5YC]; cf. LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS: GIVING OUR
CHILDREN THE FREEDOM WE HAD WITHOUT GOING NUTS WITH WORRY 16 (2009) (“The
chances of any one American child being kidnapped and killed by a stranger are almost
infinitesimally small: .00007 percent.”). Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Cyberbullying
Legislation: Why Education Is Preferable to Regulation, 16 PROGRESS ON POINT 12, 3–4
(2009)
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.12-cyberbullying-educationbetter-than-regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL79-V5LW] (although children can be
instructed “not to talk to strangers,” this may be less effective online since deception is so
much easier); cf. Charlotte Chang, Internet Safety Survey: Who Will Protect the Children?,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 514–15 (2010) (“Just as children learn to not take candy from
strangers, they can also learn to not share personal information and about the wrongs of
internet harassment.”). Notably, while online deception could also affect adults, this Article
focuses on children, as this form of deception might carry greater risks. With the emergence
of the Internet of Things (IoT)—the connecting of ordinary objects to the internet—these
risks might be amplified. See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June
22, 2009), https://www.rfidjournal.com/that-internet-of-things-thing-3 [https://perma.cc/
4GYR-S4JW]; see also Hertzel, supra note 15, at 434. The evolution of smart toys, such
as toys that are communicative to children via the IoT, might further blur the distinction
between a seemingly friendly toy that is communicating with a child and an adversary who
hacked the child’s smart toy and communicates through it. See Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair
and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 787 (2015) (arguing that young children might
become attached to robots “acting autonomously” and “disclose secrets to the robot that
they would not tell their parents or teachers”); Haber, supra note 15, at 405–09, 427 n.177
(arguing that it is very difficult for children, especially young ones, “to distinguish what is
real from what is not real”).
42
In a 2018 study of teenage engagement online, forty-five percent of participants said
they used the internet “almost constantly,” up from twenty-four percent a few years
beforehand. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, THE CONNECTED PARENT 35 (2020).
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to the extent that many experts insist such engagement constitutes
addiction.43 Some view online activity as a waste of time,44 but
online engagement can be highly valuable.45 The problem lies in
children’s extensive internet use, particularly on social media, because such use is associated with severe physical and mental health
issues. Adolescents who are heavy internet users are more likely to
experience insomnia and other sleep disturbances, stress, loneliness,
depression, and anxiety.46 Time on Facebook is negatively associated with well-being,47 and studies show that reducing time on the
platform increases life satisfaction, alleviates depressive symptoms,
and generally leads to a healthier lifestyle, including more physical
activity and less smoking.48 In contrast, more frequent social media
use is correlated with higher rates of experiencing body dissatisfaction and developing eating disorders.49 However, at the same time,
43

The 2020 Netflix docudrama, Social Dilemma, detailed the insidious methods that
social media platforms use to cause addiction and profit from it while taking up increasing
amounts of people’s time. See generally SOCIAL DILEMMA (Netflix 2020). However, the
science of addiction is not conclusive because the definition of addiction includes not only
frequent use, but also impairment of other areas of life by the extent of that use. Among
other online activities, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual refers to “gaming disorder”
as a condition that may qualify as a mental disorder, but requires further research. See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 3 (5th ed. 2013). Gaming disorder involves a situation in which people are
immersed in the game world, which takes precedent over other activities. PALFREY &
GASSER, supra note 42, at 112–13.
44
Many parents are extremely distressed about the time their children spend on screens
because of their negative evaluation of this activity. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42, at
19, 127.
45
Children can engage in online activities such as learning, activism, or maintaining
valuable relationships with family and friends. Id. at 20, 23, 30, 162, 182.
46
See, e.g., Lee M. Cheung & Wing S. Wong, The Effects of Insomnia and Internet
Addiction on Depression in Hong Kong Chinese Adolescents: An Exploratory Cross‐
Sectional Analysis, 20 J. Sleep Rsch. 311, 311 (2011).
47
See Agata Blachnio et al., Association Between Facebook Addiction, Self-Esteem and
Life Satisfaction: A Cross-Sectional Study, 55 Computs. in Hum. Behav. 701, 703 (2016)
(finding that Facebook addiction was negatively linked to life satisfaction).
48
See Julia Brailovskaia et al., Less Facebook Use—More Well-Being and a Healthier
Lifestyle? An Experimental Intervention Study, 108 COMPUTS. IN HUM. BEHAV. 1, 5 (2020)
(describing how 140 participants in the study reduced their daily Facebook time by twenty
minutes and showed improvement in self-reported well-being relative to a control group
who continued using Facebook as usual).
49
Annalise G. Mabe et al., Do You “Like” My Photo? Facebook Use Maintains Eating
Disorder Risk, 47 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 516, 519 (2014); Jaime E. Sidani et al., The
Association Between Social Media Use and Eating Concerns Among US Young Adults, 116
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the internet acts as an important source of mental health information
and emotional support, which can be immensely helpful in treating
these conditions.50
One might argue that introducing new technology has always
posed new risks and altered existing ones, and that most concerns
are just another form of media panic.51 There is some merit to this
argument; the world has never been completely safe for children,
and a parent’s role vis-à-vis this challenge is the same as it has always been—to guide and advise their child, build trust, and maintain
an open channel of communication.52
While we acknowledge the importance of providing education
and securing a parent–child relationship, we seek to illuminate the
novel risks and challenges present in the modern, digital age.53
Taken together, the broad scope of content,54 the nearly infinite
number of users around the world who can communicate with children, and the fact that children may be exposed to online dangers
while out of their parents’ sight, makes the internet a whole new ball
game of threats to children. Since online activity is time-consuming

J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 1465, 1470 (2016) (finding participants in the highest
quartiles for social media volume and frequency were significantly more likely to have
eating issues).
50
Self-rating scales, for example, are available online and are important as they can
encourage people with mental health issues to seek medical help. See Durkee et al., supra
note 34, at 3946 (stating that children and adolescents are especially likely to seek
emotional support on social media).
51
Based on this argument, adults might be panicking about the dangers of new media
usage by their children because it is unfamiliar and threatening to them. See Kirsten
Drotner, Dangerous Media? Panic Discourses and Dilemmas of Modernity, 35 INT’L J.
HIST. EDUC. 593, 595 (1999); Michael Z. Newman, Children of the ‘80s Never Fear: Video
Games Did Not Ruin Your Life, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 25, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/children-80s-never-fear-video-games-did-notruin-your-life-180963452/#aLUAvkSrMsR8ibwR.99 [https://perma.cc/9C6G-5PTB]; see
also PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42, at 82.
52
See generally SONIA LIVINGSTONE & ALICIA BLUM-ROSS, PARENTING FOR A DIGITAL
FUTURE: HOW HOPES AND FEARS ABOUT TECHNOLOGY SHAPE CHILDREN’S LIVES (2020).
53
See BENTLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 4–5.
54
As an example, some estimate that 720,000 hours of new content is uploaded to
YouTube every day. See James Hale, More Than 500 Hours of Content Are Now Being
Uploaded to YouTube Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (May 7, 2019), https://tubefilter.com/
2019/05/07/number-hours-video-uploaded-to-youtube-per-minute [https://perma.cc/J8L38AWC].

2021]

ALGORITHMIC PARENTING

13

and difficult to monitor, parents fear they may be completely unaware if their child is in trouble.55 These unique circumstances make
it more challenging to protect children against online risks.
This invites a regulatory question: how can we keep children
safe? Should protection stay within the realm of parental discretion
as part of a parent’s general responsibility to protect and care for
their child? Are there other modalities of behavioral regulation that
could help protect children online, such as social norms, the market,
or technology? Should the law step in and regulate children’s safety?
If so, how?
II. REGULATING CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ONLINE
Behavior regulation takes many forms. While the law is often a
natural candidate for behavioral regulation, legal rules are but one
modality for regulating behavior. Behavioral regulation may also be
accomplished through social norms, the market, and technology, either independently or combined.56 In choosing the optimal modality,
one must consider the associated costs, the effectiveness in substantially reducing online risks to children, and the implications on existing rights and liberties (of both children and adults).
This Part examines how these modalities aid the regulation of
children’s protection online. It begins with a discussion of the current legal regime governing children’s online protection and normatively assesses the challenges policymakers face. Then, it details
current non-legal modalities, focusing on parental self-regulation,
55

See Protecting Children Online, supra note 28 (“Over 75% of Internet crimes
involving sexual solicitations of children and exposure to unwanted pornography is not
reported to police or parents.”); Oksana Caivano et al., When You Think You Know: The
Effectiveness of Restrictive Mediation on Parental Awareness of Cyberbullying
Experiences Among Children and Adolescents, 14 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, no. 1, 2020, at para.
3. (stating that parents are not very good at evaluating their children’s experiences; parents
of children in elementary school underestimated their participation in cyber aggression,
whereas parents of adolescents in high school overestimated their participation in cyber
aggression).
56
As suggested by Lawrence Lessig, four modalities could regulate behavior: the
market, social norms, technology (code), and law. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION
2.0 120–37 (2006) [hereinafter CODE 2.0]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 116–73 (2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE].
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social norms, the market, and technological developments that preceded AI algorithms. After showing why existing modalities are insufficient to meet the current landscape, Part III will introduce and
discuss the rise of algorithmic parenting, analyze its challenges, and
offer a toolkit for policymakers to accommodate it.
A. Legal Framework Addressing Children’s Online Safety
In the context of child safety, the law sets forth a general framework for distinguishing legal from illegal conduct, regardless of
whether such activities occur online or offline. Criminal and civil
laws set the playing field, identifying unlawful behavior and a corresponding threshold that determines when children become legally
responsible for their actions.57 In some instances, policymakers
could strengthen existing laws to meet risks and address harms resulting from online activity. For example, lawmakers could pass a
statute that explicitly criminalizes sending sexual communications
to a child58 or restricting convicted felons’ access to social networking sites.59 However, the general legal framework outlining illegal
conduct does not advance children’s safety very far without effective enforcement mechanisms in place to protect children who partake in online activity. While the law presupposes the existence of
effective enforcement mechanisms, children are often reluctant to
tell anyone, let alone their parents, about illegal activities they encounter,60 if they even understand that a violation of law occurred.
More broadly, using the law to protect children requires more
than general criminal restrictions and legislation targeting illicit conduct. Rather, a robust legal solution aimed at addressing the

57

For more on the age of legal responsibility in various legal contexts, see
generally Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107 (2012).
58
See, e.g., Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 67 (UK) (criminalizing sexual
communication with a child in England and Wales, an offence that carries a maximum twoyear prison sentence). In the United States, few states have enacted laws that criminalize
attempts to solicit a minor to engage in sexual activity through online communication. See,
e.g., Julie Sorenson Stanger, Comment, Salvaging States’ Rights to Protect Children from
Internet Predation: State Power to Regulate Internet Activity Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 2005 BYU L. REV. 191, 193–97 n.11 (2005). Another example is
cyberbullying, against which victims could try using existing harassment or criminal laws.
59
See Chang, supra note 41, at 505–06.
60
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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challenges described above requires more intricate consideration of
the class it aims to protect, the nature of the threats, and the potential
consequences regulation may have on children’s well-being, development, and relationships.
There is little doubt that the state has a duty to protect children
from harm.61 Not only has this duty been recognized in the domestic
laws of all jurisdictions,62 but also states have created systems and
invested resources to fulfill the duty.63 In 1989, the United Nations
adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“the Convention”), which was formally recognized in the international arena.64
The Convention, which the United States abstained from ratifying,65
marked the first international attempt to protect children under the
age of eighteen by mandating, among other things: the protection of
children’s rights to life, survival, and development; the right to nondiscrimination; the right to education; the protection from violence
and sexual exploitation; the right to privacy; and the right to freedom
of expression, thought, and association.66 Notably, in the context of
this Article, the Convention granted children the right to the provision of assistance, protection, prevention of harm, and participation.67 It required that “child[ren] ha[ve] access to information and
61

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (upholding the state’s interest
in protecting the welfare of children); Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech,
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 6 (2004).
62
See, e.g., Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 1, 27–31 (2004) (giving examples of jurisdictions in which there is a positive
legal duty to protect children).
63
See CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND ORIENTATIONS 6 (Neil
Gilbert et al. eds., 2011). Different countries take different views on what they are required
to do: those that take a narrow view “tend to focus on protecting children from the risk of
harm and providing basic social safety nets; those that take a broad degree of responsibility
also protect children from the risk of unequal life outcomes as a result of their social
standing or upbringing.” Id.
64
See Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 2, 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
65
See id.; Treaty Ratification, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/human-rights/treatyratification [https://perma.cc/NPT5-2MUR] (the United States signed the convention on
February 16, 1995 but has not ratified it).
66
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, at arts. 2, 3, 6, 8, 12–17, 19,
28–30.
67
See id. These rights are often termed the “four P’s” of the CRC (provision of
assistance, protection, prevention of harm, participation) (sometimes referred to as the
“three P’s”). See, e.g., Sonia Livingstone, Reframing Media Effects in Terms of Children’s
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material,” while signatories could establish “appropriate guidelines
for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being . . . .”68
Domestic legislation acknowledging online risks to children followed when Congress passed the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”) in 1996.69 The CDA included “indecency provisions” to
protect children from online pornography.70 However, these provisions were eventually struck down as unconstitutional for infringing
free speech rights under the First Amendment.71
In 1998, Congress enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), designed to protect children under the age
of thirteen from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection
with personal information.72 The Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) was tasked with enforcing COPPA and promulgating and
updating rules for compliance.73 COPPA applies to online service
Rights in the Digital Age, 10 J. CHILD. & MEDIA 4, 5 (2016); see also The UNCRC,
Children’s Rights and Should Children Make Decisions About Their Lives, WE HAVE KIDS,
https://wehavekids.com/parenting/Should-children-be-protected-from-Desicion-Makingin-their-Lives [https://perma.cc/NDJ3-WWNV] (Mar. 9, 2020) (“Within the UNCRC
children’s rights are divided into four groups, known as the four p’s.”).
68
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, at art. 17.
69
Notably, there have been a few attempts to shield children from other types of media
consumption. One example is Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
is designed to require cable television operators to scramble, block, or limit sexual content.
Eventually, the Supreme Court struck down this section because less restrictive means were
available. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), invalidated by United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
70
See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
71
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); see generally Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
141 (1997) (providing more discussion of this case).
72
See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), Pub. L. No. 106-170, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018)). Notably, in
1974, Congress protected children’s privacy to some extent with the enactment of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), which regulates children’s
informational privacy and family privacy and applies to educational institutions’ release of
educational records to unauthorized persons. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1); Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Aug. 25, 2021),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5JXZ3EYP].
73
See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (2013); 15 U.S.C.
§ 6505; 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(l)–(m), 53(b). The COPPA rule has been in effect since April
2000. For the latest update, see Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 78 Fed. Reg.
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providers (“OSPs”) that target or knowingly collect personal information from children under the age of thirteen.74 It requires these
actors to adhere to several legal principles—known as fair information practices—including notice, consent, access, data minimization, security, and enforcement.75 With some differences, the European Union took a similar approach in enacting the General Data
Protection Regulation.76

3972 (Jan. 17, 2013). See Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy:
Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 809, 817 (2011); see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 599 (2014) (“An ‘unfair or
deceptive’ act or practice is a material ‘representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment’
or a practice that ‘causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.’”). Substantial injury, in this instance, could apply
to both financial harms and unwarranted health and safety risks.
74
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2013); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(1), 6502, 6501(8). Specifically,
COPPA requires websites that fall under its scope to (1) include a notice containing what
information is collected, how collected information is used, and the website’s information
disclosure practices; (2) obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or
disclosure of such personal information; (3) grant parents the ability to obtain a description
of the specific types of personal information collected from the child by that operator and
have the opportunity to refuse further use or maintenance or future online collection of
personal information from that child; (4) provide reasonable means, in the given
circumstances, for the parent to obtain any personal information collected from that child;
(5) adhere to data retention and deletion requirements; (6) not condition a child’s
participation in a game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on the child disclosing
more personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in such activity; and
(7) establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security,
and integrity of personal information collected from children. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1);
16 C.F.R. §§ 312.4–312.10 (2013). See also Eldar Haber, The Internet of Children:
Protecting Children’s Privacy in a Hyper-Connected World, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209,
1224–25 (2020) (discussing COPPA further).
75
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3–4 (May 2000); Garber, supra note
15, at 153.
76
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) protects all data subjects within the
European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA), but also sets higher
standards for all collection, use, and disclosure of data when children’s data are involved.
Under Article 8, parental consent is required for all children younger than sixteen when
online services are offered directly to them; EU member states can lower the age threshold
to thirteen. Consequently, Recital 38 requires prior parental consent before processing
children’s personal data. See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
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A final legislative measure relating to children’s risks online is
the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”).77 Enacted in 2001,
CIPA conditions the allocation of certain federal funds to K–12
schools and libraries upon the use of filters and other measures
aimed at protecting children from obscene and harmful online content.78 CIPA, however, is highly limited, as it merely targets internet
access in specific schools and libraries and defines harmful content
relatively narrowly.79
COPPA is the primary regulation in the United States for protecting children’s privacy rights.80 While not designed for the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 8, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. For
further reading on the EU’s perception of protecting children’s privacy, see generally Milda
Macenaite, From Universal Towards Child-Specific Protection of the Right to Privacy
Online: Dilemmas in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
765 (2017); Sonia Livingstone, Children: A Special Case for Privacy?, 46 INTERMEDIA 18
(2018).
77
See Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A335 (2001) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)). Other
legislative acts enacted to protect children could also apply online in some instances. See,
e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650-93 (2003) (providing, inter alia, protection
of children from sexual exploitation). Notably, this Act also incorporated the Truth in
Domain Names Act (TDNA), which made unlawful the use of deceitful domain names for
the purpose of attracting individuals to pornographic websites. See Truth in Domain Names
Act of 2003, S. 800, 108th Cong. (2003), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252B(a)–(b). For further reading
on the CIPA and TDNA, see generally Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress
Ever Get It Right? A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and
Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 721, 738–59 (2004); Christopher G. Clark, Note,
The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat
Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1512–13 (2004); Michael Honig, Commentary,
The Truth About the Truth in Domain Names Act: Why This Recently Enacted Law Is
Unconstitutional, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 141 (2004).
78
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B).
79
CIPA was challenged on constitutional grounds but was eventually upheld by the
Court. See United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003). For more on CIPA,
see generally Felix Wu, United States v. American Library Ass’n: The Children’s Internet
Protection Act Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555
(2004). Notably, some states have enacted laws that also relate to filtering in publicly
funded schools or libraries. For a list of these state laws, see Laws Relating to Filtering,
Blocking and Usage Policies in Schools and Libraries, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS
(July 10, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/state-internet-filtering-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/58ZN-ZDZ2].
80
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1224–25.
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protection of children’s safety per se, COPPA indirectly promotes
safety (albeit in a limited way) for several reasons. First, it applies
to the collection of personal information online, which includes, inter alia, names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other identifiers
that make it possible to contact children, either online or physically.81 By regulating the collection of personal information,
COPPA mitigates some of the safety risks facing children.82
COPPA also helps protect children by requiring “verifiable parental consent” before engaging in data collection.83 This provision
requires parents to engage with the technology their children use and
strengthens parents’ involvement in their children’s internet activity.84 Similarly, COPPA addresses children’s safety by protecting
the confidentiality, security, and integrity of children’s personal information. It requires OSPs to establish and maintain reasonable
procedures specifically protecting children under thirteen.85 Strict
security requirements help reduce the risk of adversaries gaining unauthorized access to databases or websites that store children’s data.
Perhaps the most significant feature of COPPA in the context of
children’s safety is parents’ right to review personal information
provided by their child.86 OSPs must provide “reasonable means”
for parents to review personal information collected from a child and
prohibit further use or maintenance of the data.87 Essentially, this
grants parents a monitoring right.88 If policymakers extend the scope
of this monitoring right and apply it (with proper modifications) to
children’s safety, then perhaps parents will be granted more than just
a mere legal right to monitor their children’s communications. Rather, OSPs may have a legal obligation to equip parents with monitoring technology while also acknowledging children’s autonomy
and the limits of parental monitoring.
81

See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8).
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1235–36.
83
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (2013).
84
For example, this can be done by zoning their children’s use of the internet—namely,
which websites they are allowed to visit or content they are allowed to share.
85
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2013).
86
See id. § 312.6.
87
Id. § 312.3(c).
88
For more on the problems that stem from such monitoring right, see Haber, supra note
15, at 443–53.
82
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The current regulatory framework is highly important for protecting children from data-mining.89 The problem, however, is that
COPPA was crafted to achieve a different goal and is limited in
scope.90 Because the law primarily addresses privacy concerns arising from data-mining, it fails to address most other risks that children encounter online.91 This is true even in the face of exceptions
for child-data related activity, such as abusing children’s data to deceive and interact with them. Like many other countries, the United
States focuses mostly on protecting children’s data from collection
and manipulation, which, though important, represent merely a fraction of online risks, and hardly the worst of them.92
Another crucial shortcoming of COPPA is that it applies only to
children under the age of thirteen.93 While children are entitled to
increasing independence and autonomy as they age, the dangers detailed above are not limited to children under the age of thirteen. To
the contrary, some dangers are especially acute in adolescence as
children begin owning smartphones and other connected devices,
become independent internet users, and create profiles on social media platforms.94
This is where our policymakers must step in. They must assess
the scale and extent of risks facing children online and adapt current
legislation to offer better protection for children. Admittedly, it is
not that American policymakers have never attempted to regulate
online risks for children.95 Congress and state legislatures have tried
various legal measures aimed toward reducing risks to children

89

For more suggestions on how to recalibrate COPPA to meet new challenges that the
internet poses to children, see id. at 428–43; Haber, supra note 74, at 1233–48.
90
For instance, COPPA applies only to commercial websites or online services targeted
to children or with actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information from
children. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(10), 6502(b)(1)(A).
91
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1232.
92
See supra notes 27–49 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.
93
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1224.
94
See supra notes 27–49 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.
95
For examples of failed congressional acts and other forms of children-related
regulation struck down by the court, see generally Adam Thierer, Congress, Content
Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, PROGRESS ON POINT
(Feb.
2008),
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html
[https://perma.cc/L8JJ-EEM6].
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online, especially relating to harmful content.96 For instance, Congress attempted to ban social media use in places where children can
access computers, such as in schools and public libraries.97 State
legislatures have also pushed for regulation requiring social media
sites to implement reliable age verification algorithms.98 However,
by now these proposed solutions are obsolete given the exponential
growth in internet accessibility (via smartphones, for instance).99
Further, some solutions are highly limited in scope, focusing mostly
on social media100 or merely preventing access to pornography.101
A potential legal solution is imposing responsibilities on intermediaries like OSPs to reduce online risks.102 This could include
holding OSPs liable for failing to identify harmful content—and either blocking or reporting it—or misconduct by children.103 This

96

See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA) of 2006, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong.
(2006) (proposing to ban social networking sites in public schools and libraries).
98
See Szoka & Thierer, supra note 41, at 3.
99
In Britain, for instance, “[s]martphone ownership by children in particular has risen
sharply, with close to half of all 5 to 15 year olds owning a smartphone according to
Ofcom” while “the average age of children getting a smartphone in the UK is 10.” See THE
CHILD.’S SOC’Y & YOUNGMINDS, SAFETY NET: CYBERBULLYING’S IMPACT ON YOUNG
PEOPLE’S MENTAL HEALTH 13 (2018), https://www.youngminds.org.uk/media/dp0mu4l5/
pcr144b_social_media_cyberbullying_inquiry_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8ZKPU53].
100
See Deleting Online Predators Act, supra note 97.
101
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
102
For further reading on intermediary liability, see generally Giancarlo F. Frosio,
Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single
Market Strategy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 19 (2017).
103
See, for instance, the Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s
Youth Act (SAFETY) for an attempt to require service providers to retain information
about users’ IP addresses. Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s
Youth Act (SAFETY), H.R. 837, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007). For another legislative attempt
to incentivize private sector cooperation with internet safety initiatives, see the Internet
Safety Act. SAFE Internet Act, S. 1047, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). Perhaps the most famous
example is the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which was designed to reduce the
exposure of children to inappropriate materials online by limiting commercial computer
communications deemed harmful to minors. COPA eventually failed to pass constitutional
muster as it placed an impermissible “burden” on speech. See Child Online Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998), invalidated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656 (2004). For more on regulatory attempts to shield children from sexual content
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft, see generally Steven E. Merlis, Preserving
Internet Expression While Protecting Our Children: Solutions Following Ashcroft v.
97
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solution sounds promising upon first glance given OSPs’ ability to
identify harmful content on their networks and their position as the
cheapest (or least) cost avoiders.104
However, this is not an ideal solution. From a practical perspective, OSPs may have trouble deciding whether specific content is
actually risky or harmful to children. Although some instances may
be relatively uncontested—such as pornographic websites—others
would prove ambiguous.105 Even more concerning, a legal duty to
restrict harmful content could threaten constitutionally protected
speech. OSPs currently enjoy immunity under Section 230 of the
CDA.106 While some propose reducing Section 230 immunity,107 it
is unlikely that such legislation would pass constitutional muster due
to its potential infringement of First Amendment rights.108
The result is current legislation and regulations that do not offer
viable solutions to the various risks that online life entails. Can the
law do more to protect children? Or would other modalities, such as
market forces or education, be more effective? We now move on to
examining how online safety could be promoted without legal intervention.
B. Online Safety Without Legal Intervention
Legal rules are but one modality of regulating behavior. Other
modalities, like social norms, the market, and technology—either
ACLU, 4 NW. J. TECH. &. INTELL. PROP. 117 (2005); Michael B. Cassidy, Note, To Surf
and Protect: The Children’s Internet Protection Act Polices Material Harmful to Minors
and a Whole Lot More, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 437 (2005).
104
The cheapest (least) cost avoider is known in tort law and generally refers to the
capability of preventing an accident at the lowest cost. For more on this theory in the
context of online intermediaries, see generally Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for
Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002).
105
See Chang, supra note 41, at 521–22.
106
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
107
For instance, Bradley Areheart suggested enacting “notice and takedown” liability for
“tortious cyberbullying,” wherein failing to remove the content could lead to liability. See
Chang, supra note 41, at 521 (quoting Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies
Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41 (2007)). Joan Lukey
proposed a system whereby OSPs would be obliged to remove some harmful content upon
the filing of a lawsuit. See Chang, supra note 41, at 522–23.
108
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The main fear would arise from its potential vagueness and
over-inclusiveness, which could lead to a chilling effect. See Chang, supra note 41, at 522.
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separately or in combination—might be optimal for achieving
online safety. One might argue that children’s safety both online and
offline could, and perhaps should, be protected through non-legal
interventions.
Parents are first and foremost tasked with protecting children.
This is not only a legal duty, but a moral one,109 and is a defining
characteristic of the family as a social construct. Like the physical
world, it is no surprise that many parents seek ways to keep their
children safe online without any legal obligation to do so.110 Many
parents invest significant time and thought into planning how to best
prepare their children for the digital world. This involves making
decisions about what online activities their children will be able to

109

See generally John Eekelaar, Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for Their
Children?, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 340 (1991) (discussing parental obligations); Nellie
Wieland, Parental Obligation, 23 UTILITAS 249, 255 (2011) (“Biological parents, being
causally responsible for the existence of their children, presumably inherit a moral
responsibility to care adequately for their dependent children . . . .”); James Lindemann
Nelson, Parental Obligations and the Ethics of Surrogacy: A Causal Perspective, 5 PUB.
AFFS. Q. 49, 50–57 (1991) (discussing “intentional” versus “causal” parental obligations).
For more context on parental responsibilities and genetics, see generally PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEUROSCIENCE AND GENETICS (Kristien Hens et al.
eds., 2017).
110
At least some statistics have shown that parents are not using parental control tools
because many trust their children online to follow the rules they have set. Other parents,
however, do not use parental controls because they are unsure how to use those tools, don’t
realize those tools exist, are concerned about costs of the tools, or have doubts about their
effectiveness. See FAM. ONLINE SAFETY INST., WHO NEEDS PARENTAL CONTROLS? A
SURVEY OF AWARENESS, ATTITUDES, AND USE OF ONLINE PARENTAL CONTROLS 3–8 (2011).
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participate in,111 limitations on screen time,112 and guidelines for behavior—in other words, deciding the dos and don’ts.113
However, most modern approaches to good parenting involve
more than rule-setting and decision-making. For example, parents
focus on nurturing a trusting relationship with their children by
opening communication channels where parents can offer guidance
through dilemmas, and consolation or encouragement through heartbreak and disappointment. These relationships are extremely valuable to parents and children alike. More specifically, these relationships are crucial for recognizing and addressing the risks children
face.114 Engaging in dialogue and building trust over the years
111

For many parents, this involves educating themselves about the internet and its
opportunities and risks; it also depends on the different values parents hold. See
LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 11–14 (recognizing three typical parental
reactions to technology depending on their values, abilities, and preferences: embrace,
balance, and resist).
112
See, e.g., FAM. ONLINE SAFETY INST., ONLINE SAFETY ACROSS THE GENERATIONS 6
(2018), available at http://fosi-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2018Report_
FR_d6_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7DY-96MA] (“To keep their connected children safe
online, 91% of parents set household rules, 63% report using at least one of a variety of
parental control tools, and 64% frequently discuss online safety with their child.”);
LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 45–46 (arguing that the content and context
of online activity was more important than screen time). For a similar argument and
practical recommendations concerning screen time limitations for children of different
ages, see PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42, at 29–33 (citing Press Release, American
Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Pediatrics Announces New
Recommendations for Children’s Media Use (Oct. 21, 2016) https://www.aap.org/en/
news-room/news-releases/aap/2016/aap-announces-new-recommendations-for-media-use
[https://perma.cc/Q83S-FVE4]) (recommending that children from birth to eighteen
months of age avoid screens altogether; eighteen months to two years—fifteen minutes a
day; two to five years—one hour a day; six to twelve years—up to two hours a day; twelve
to fifteen—no more than four hours a day).
113
See Szoka & Thierer, supra note 41, at 19–20 (offering the following rules: (1) ”treat
others you meet online with the same respect that you would accord them in person”;
(2) ”do not bully or harass your peers”; (3) ”avoid using lewd or obscene language online
or in communications”; (4) ”do not post negative comments about your teachers or
principals online”; (5) ”do not post or share inappropriate pictures of yourself or others”;
(6) ”be extremely careful about talking to strangers online”; (7) ”do not share your personal
information with unknown parties”; and (8) ”talk to parents and educators about serious
online concerns and report dangerous situations or harassing communications to them”).
114
See, e.g., Elise R. DeVore & Kenneth R. Ginsburg, The Protective Effects of Good
Parenting on Adolescents, 17 Current Op. Pediatrics 460, 463 (2005) (demonstrating the
significant, enduring, and protective influence of positive parenting practices on
adolescents).
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makes it more likely that a child will confide in a parent upon encountering online bullying or inappropriate internet behavior.115 Ongoing dialogue between parents and children about the digital world
and its challenges will allow children to understand and reflect on
matters before they arise, such as appropriate online behavior and
truth versus falsehood in online expressions. Some parents are directly involved in their children’s online activity116 by using technology to bond with their children, share experiences, and create
overlapping areas of interest.117 Shared online activity can also help
model appropriate content and behavior.118
Children’s safety and well-being increases when parents shape
online behavior and habits using education and rule-setting.119
Moreover, knowing what constitutes prudent online behavior is a
valuable asset that children will enjoy into adulthood.120 While recognizing the importance of digital education, this solution is imperfect on its own. Parental involvement varies family to family and

115

See Josephine Kearney & Kay Bussey, The Longitudinal Influence of Self-Efficacy,
Communication and Parenting on Spontaneous Adolescent Disclosure, 25 J. RSCH. ON
ADOLESCENCE 506, 516 (2015) (finding that perceived openness in relationship with
mother predicted the amount of information shared); PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42,
at 12.
116
Scholars often use the term parental mediation to describe the methods parents use to
regulate and educate their children’s experiences with media. See, e.g., Claudia van
Kruistum & Roel van Steensel, The Tacit Dimension of Parental Mediation, 11
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, no. 3, 2017, at para 1. Regarding parental mediation of television
watching, some scholars have offered three styles of such mediation: instructive mediation,
restrictive mediation, and social co-viewing. See Patti M. Valkenburg et al., Developing a
Scale to Assess Three Styles of Television Mediation: “Instructive Mediation,”
“Restrictive Mediation,” and “Social Coviewing,” 43 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 52, 52–
53 (1999). In the context of internet mediation, see Sook-Jung Lee & Young-Gil Chae,
Children’s Internet Use in a Family Context: Influence on Family Relationships and
Parental Mediation, 10 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 640, 642–43 (2007); Livingstone
& Helsper, supra note 21, at 584; Leslie Haddon, Children’s Critical Evaluation of
Parental Mediation, 9 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, no. 2, 2015, at para 4.
117
See LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 88–89 (describing a parent who
“had embedded into her and [her son’s] relationship their mutual fascination with all things
technological.”).
118
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42, at 13, 59, 62, 73.
119
See Chang, supra note 41, at 524–27; see also Szoka & Thierer, supra note 41, at 17–
19 (listing advantages of an education-based approach).
120
In fact, although this Article is primarily concerned with the protection of children,
adults obviously face online dangers too.
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relates to a parent’s capabilities and circumstances.121 In addition to
influences that hinder parental guidance, such as lack of time and
limited emotional availability, not all parents have sufficient technological knowhow and skills to meaningfully engage their children
in discussion on these issues.122
Technological literacy and parenting capabilities are not evenly
distributed throughout society and often correlate with social
class.123 Despite the ubiquity of technology use in developed countries, the “digital divide” on the basis of socio-economic status has
not disappeared. Rather, it has taken on different forms.124 Children
from advantaged backgrounds are less likely to spend excessive
time online and more likely to engage in high-quality activity online
such as coding, independent learning, and games that build skills.125
The digital divide raises a concern that children from disadvantaged
backgrounds are less likely to benefit from the kind of parental support likely to decrease risky and unsafe online behavior. Parenting
styles are a matter of choice and ideology, but are also constructed
and confined by social class and life circumstance. It is difficult for
single parents, uneducated parents, and parents struggling

121

See generally LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52.
See Randall S. Davies, Understanding Technology Literacy: A Framework for
Evaluating Educational Technology Integration, 55 TECHTRENDS 45, 49–50 (2011);
Parents Unaware of Dangers Faced by Children on Smartphones, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11,
2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26121434
[https://perma.cc/2G8GYAU4].
123
For a discussion of the digital divide, see Eszter Hargittai, The Digital Divide and
What to Do About It, in NEW ECONOMY HANDBOOK 821, 821–38 (Derek C. Jones ed.,
2003).
124
See Nellie Bowles, The Digital Gap Between Rich and Poor Kids Is Not What We
Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/style/digitaldivide-screens-schools.html [https://perma.cc/TB6Z-PPHF]; PALFREY & GASSER, supra
note 42, at 101, 144.
125
See Courtenay Harris et al., A Socioeconomic Related ‘Digital Divide’ Exists in How,
Not If, Young People Use Computers, PLOS ONE, Mar. 31, 2017, at 9; LIVINGSTONE &
BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 64–68, 78 (describing the limited possibilities for lowincome parents to direct their children’s use of technology; inequality persists also in
advantage conferring activities such as coding classes because the well-off draw on their
resources to access advanced courses whereas low-income children must rely on what is
offered in school).
122

2021]

ALGORITHMIC PARENTING

27

financially to engage in the type of parental practices necessary to
nurture well-being-promoting behavior online.126
Further, differences in values and beliefs influence the kind of
education parents may offer their children about online behavior.127
For example, in past decades, many parenting styles involved intensive engagement. Referred to as “helicopter parenting,” this style
involved a parent’s tendency to hover over children, overprotecting
them not only from risks, but also disappointment, frustration, and
mistakes.128 A contrasting parenting trend provided a less structured
environment for children and encouraged more freedom and autonomy.129
Given the reality and potential severity of harm stemming from
online activity, relying solely on parents and social norms is an inadequate solution. The limitations of parental involvement might be
mitigated by involving other agents in the educational setting.130
Schools and institutions offering extracurricular education play a
role in instilling appropriate norms. Research shows that discussing
internet-related issues with teachers reduces online risks for teenagers.131 Thus, schools could shoulder some of the digital education

126

See LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 64–68 (stating that “while
[marginalized] mothers were positive about technology, they were not well placed to
encourage their children toward more advanced independent or creative pursuits that would
give them digital skills.”)
127
See LIVINGSTONE & BLUM-ROSS, supra note 52, at 14–17.
128
Helicopter parenting is just one term for this phenomenon; others are “invasive
parenting,” “overparenting,” and “snowplow parenting.” This generally describes parents
who are “obsessed with their children’s success and safety [and] vigilantly hover over
them, sheltering them from mistakes, disappointment, or risks . . . .” See Kathleen Vinson,
Hovering Too Close: The Ramifications of Helicopter Parenting in Higher Education, 29
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 423, 424 (2013); Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2011).
129
David Pimentel, Protecting the Free-Range Kid: Recalibrating Parents’ Rights and
the Best Interests of the Child, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2016).
130
The proposed Internet Safety Act was designed, inter alia, to initiate a funded program
to educate children and parents on internet safety. See SAFE Internet Act, S. 1047, 111th
Cong. (2009).
131
See Wonsun Shin & May O. Lwin, How Does “Talking About the Internet with
Others” Affect Teenagers’ Experience of Online Risks? The Role of Active Mediation by
Parents, Peers, and School Teachers, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1109, 1121 (2017). Shin
& Lwin also found that discussing these issues with peers increased exposure to risky
behavior. Id. at 1121–22.
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responsibility. In addition, companies like Disney, who create content for children, could address these issues in their shows as they
do with other issues of social importance such as racial and cultural
diversity.132 Combining these efforts may raise awareness and shape
social norms of online behavior, make children less prone to risky
behavior (such as sending photographs of themselves), and less
likely to commit online harm as perpetrators. Therefore, from a
broader institutional perspective, one might suggest that the state
should educate both children and parents on internet risks and proper
online behavior.
However, even if variations among parental education are reduced and social norms improved, it is unlikely these risks will be
eliminated. Undesirable activity will likely continue, such as online
harassment or inappropriate content-sharing.133 So, while digital education is crucial, reducing online risks necessitates combining digital education with other modalities.134
The final two modalities are closely linked – the market and
technology. Technology is a promising candidate for reducing children’s online risks. With sufficient demand, technology could have
a significant market where commercial companies are incentivized
to develop and offer risk-minimizing features in their products and
services.135 Indeed, OSPs respond to parental demand by providing

132

See generally Ute Sartorious Kradey, Sunny Days on Sesame Street? Multiculturalism
and Resistance Postmodernism, 26 J. COMMC’N INQUIRY 9 (2002) (discussing Sesame
Street’s role in education for multiculturalism); cf. Maja Rudloff, (Post)Feminist
Paradoxes: The Sensibilities of Gender Representation in Disney’s Frozen, 35 OUTSKIRTS,
2016, at 1–2 (arguing that despite the attempt to create “new” female characters, they are
still archetypical, conservative, sexist, and even racist).
133
For more context of selling pornographic magazines to minors under New York law,
see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634–35 (1968).
134
Cf. Adam Thierer, Rep. Bean’s “SAFER NET Act”: An Education-Based Approach
to Online Child Safety, 14.3 PROGRESS ON POINT (Feb. 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=975507 [https://perma.cc/HQ98-9VNM] (arguing that “[t]here is
simply no substitute for education”).
135
For example, Apple’s parental controls can “block or limit specific apps and features
on your child’s device.” Use Parental Controls on Your Child’s iPhone, iPad, and iPod
Touch,
APPLE
(Sept.
1,
2021),
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201304
[https://perma.cc/8YGS-TZPK].
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parental monitoring and control tools.136 Policymakers suggested
filtering harmful content137 as one of the first technological means
in protecting children from media risks.138 However, this solution
was criticized harshly, primarily because it limits free speech.139
Further, filtering solutions are only partially effective. Parents are
not always aware of them, may not know how to use them, and children are often able to bypass them.140 Moreover, even if filtering

136

See Keeping Children Safe Online, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-002 [https://perma.cc/VNV3-3J9Q]
(Sept. 2, 2021). One such attempt was made by MySpace (a social media platform) in 2008,
which reached an agreement with attorneys general to “take significant steps to better
protect children on its [website], including the creation of a broad-based task force to
explore and develop age and identity verification technology.” See Attorneys General
Announce Agreement with MySpace Regarding Social Networking Safety, 2 NAAG, no.
1 (Jan. 18, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20200805021105/https://www.naag.org/
publications/naagazette/volume_2_number_1/attorneys_general_announce_agreement_w
ith_myspace_regarding_social_networking_safety.php [https://perma.cc/FNU3-9XGA?
type=image]. Other social media sites also sometimes remove convicted sex offenders. See
Chang, supra note 41, at 504–05.
137
The use of filtering or screening technology (mainly for protection against
pornographic websites) has gained much scholarly attention. See generally, e.g., FRANK
YORK & JAN LARUE, PROTECTING YOUR CHILD IN AN X-RATED WORLD (2002); SUSAN
CHAMBERS & ANNE MEYERS, WEB GUIDE TO ONLINE SAFETY FOR KIDS (2003); Cheryl B.
Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 2007 BYU
L. REV. 1417, 1419, 1426 (2007) (offering a filtering mechanism for pornographic content
she dubs “West Coast Code”). For examples of recent parental monitoring technologies
that either filter or block content, see Nichole Cartmell, Parental Control Apps to Track
Your Child’s Smartphone Habits, (KFVS12 television broadcast July 30, 2019),
https://www.kfvs12.com/2019/07/31/parental-control-apps-track-your-childssmartphone-habits [https://perma.cc/UT3M-7MB6].
138
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for instance, requires that television sets over
thirteen inches include something termed a “V-Chip”—a technological solution giving
parents the ability to block violent and indecent programming. See Jack M. Balkin, Media
Filters, the V-Chip and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1131
(1996); Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of the V-Chip, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 429, 431 (1997).
139
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 138, at 1132; R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First
Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 757 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate
Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 630 (1998).
140
This includes instances of using unmonitored devices or technologies to bypass
filtering. See PALFREY ET AL., supra note 21, at 34 (“Minors can circumvent these [filtering
and monitoring] technologies most simply by using the Internet at friends’ houses or in
other places that do not use such technologies . . . .Increasingly, minors are also learning
how to use proxies to circumvent filters or to reformat their computers to remove parental
controls.”).
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mechanisms prove effective for certain forms of content, such as
pornography, the filters may fail to protect children from less conspicuous harms. For instance, it would be difficult to detect inappropriate contact, personal information disclosure, cyberbullying, and
internet usage detrimental to mental health, with filters alone.
Aside from practical difficulties and assuming that regulating
filtering is constitutional, there remains a substantive concern that
filtering will censor content parents would not want blocked, thus
limiting their children’s freedom of expression and information.141
For example, filters may block valuable content related to sexual
health, such as information about STDs and contraceptives, or even
works of art.142 Filtering software with an underinclusive design
may alleviate concerns but not achieve the ultimate goal of limiting
harmful content.
Another technological solution involves giving parents oversight mechanisms relating to their children’s online behavior. This
is how U.S. policymakers viewed COPPA in 1998.143 While Part III
addresses the possibility of AI-monitoring, parents can also monitor
manually. Technological oversight mechanisms are not new in
childcare, and many parents harness technology to monitor their
children’s vital signs, health, mental state, and safety.144 Once
141

The intention here is not to suggest that such filtering mechanisms, without the use of
legal modalities, are unconstitutional—the First Amendment is not implemented without
involvement of policymakers. But if the legal regime obliged OSPs to install filtering
mechanisms, that would, in all probability, fail to pass constitutional scrutiny. On the other
hand, promoting—rather than obliging—filters might be constitutional. See Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 657 (2004) (“Promoting filter use does not condemn as criminal any
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much
diminished. Filters, moreover, may well be more effective than COPA.”).
142
See Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 584
(2005).
143
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1211.
144
Many parents monitor their children’s development even before birth via ultrasound
screening. After birth, they might use technological tools to monitor their children’s
behavior and development directly, by watching and listening to them, or indirectly, such
as through wearable devices and various types of sensors, cameras, and monitors. See
Haber, supra note 15, at 444; Deborah Lupton & Ben Williamson, The Datafied Child: The
Dataveillance of Childrenand Implications for Their Rights, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
780, 783–84 (2017); Bernstein &Triger, supra note 128, at 1233 (2011). One of the main
technological developments that helps parents monitor their children’s development, vital
signs,and safety is the IoT. IoT devices could allow parents to access various sensors that
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children go online, parental monitoring takes a leap. Using available
technology, parents can install technological mechanisms that allow
them to identify the exact location of their child at any given time,145
control the amount of time their child spends online, what sites the
child can visit,146 and keep track of rules or goals the parent sets for
the child in the physical world, such as monitoring water intake or
teeth-brushing habits.147

communicatesound, imagery, and other types of data to them, giving them control of what
their children are doing and saying, along with monitoring their vital signs. For more on
parental monitoring via technology, see generally id.; Lupton & Williamson, supra note
144, at 783–84; Abby Adams, Parenting Life Hacks: Top IoT Products in Baby Care, IOT
EVOLUTION (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.iotevolutionworld.com/smart-home/articles/
437360-parenting-life-hacks-top-iot-products-baby-care.htm
[https://perma.cc/2B3PMS2S]; Margaret K. Nelson, Watching Children: Describing the Use of Baby Monitors on
Epinions.com, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 516 (2008) (examining reviews of baby monitors to
elucidate parental anxiety).
145
For instance, parents can use GPS trackers on children’s smartphones or wearables
that give parents control over their children’s activities and mainly, their location. See
Alexei Czeskis et al., Parenting from the Pocket: Value Tensions and Technical Directions
for Secure and Private Parent-Teen Mobile Safety, in SOUPS ‘10: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2010), https://dl.acm.org/
doi/10.1145/1837110.1837130 [https://perma.cc/JDT6-PZTB]; Rebecca Edwards, 2018
Best Wearable
GPS Trackers
for
Kids
Buyers
Guide,
SAFEWISE,
https://www.safewise.com/resources/wearable-gps-tracking-devices-for-kids-guide
[https://perma.cc/U6W4-7S6S] (Oct. 1, 2021).
146
While some of these technologies could be bypassed by children, parents could
generally use technological solutions to block certain web content or at least be notified
when sensitive content appears on the screen. See Czeskis et al., supra note 145. The videosharing app, TikTok, recently announced that they will grant parents more control of their
children’s account. See TikTok Expands Features to Give Parents More Control of Their
Teenagers’ Accounts, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2020, 10:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-tiktok-privacy-children/tiktok-expands-features-to-give-parents-more-controlof-their-teenagers-accounts-idUSKBN27X20P [https://perma.cc/6SNM-XFBD]; see also
Monica Anderson, How Parents Feel About—and Manage—Their Teens’ Online Behavior
and Screen Time, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/03/22/how-parents-feel-about-and-manage-their-teens-online-behavior-andscreen-time [https://perma.cc/GPN5-MWC4] (arguing that “[n]early six-in-ten parents say
they often or sometimes check which websites their teen visits or look through their child’s
cellphone call logs or messages (58% of parents say they do each of these things). A
somewhat smaller share of parents (52%) say they at least sometimes use parental controls
to restrict which sites their teen can access.”).
147
See This Electric Toothbrush Uses Games to Encourage Kids to Brush Their Teeth,
EXPRESS & STAR (July 30, 2018), https://www.expressandstar.com/news/science-andtechnology/2018/07/30/this-electric-toothbrush-uses-games-to-encourage-kids-to-brushtheir-teeth/ [https://perma.cc/B82N-3C7Z]. For more on current parental control apps, see
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Parental oversight can take further intrusive forms, with parents
opting for technology that enables them to monitor and control every
aspect of their children’s online behavior.148 Similar to the Black
Mirror episode, “Arkangel” (but luckily without microchip implants),149 parents can install monitoring mechanisms, easily gaining
control of their children’s devices to assess the risks and choose appropriate intervention.150
However, parental monitoring is not as effective as one might
expect and, perhaps more importantly, it is not always beneficial for
children. Such conduct has the potential to infringe children’s liberty, privacy, and autonomy and may negatively affect the childparent relationship.151 Adequate and robust parental monitoring necessitates tremendous knowledge, time, and attention,152 and is

Simon Chandler & Mark Jensen, The Best Parental Control Apps for Android and iOS,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-parentalcontrol-apps/ [https://perma.cc/BB3M-A35F].
148
See, e.g., Bernstein & Triger, supra note 128, at 1238–39 (listing examples of
monitoring technologies).
149
The second episode of the fourth series of anthology series Black Mirror (titled
“Arkangel”), portrays a world in which parents could implant a chip to track and monitor
their children and in which there exists pixelate images that cause them distress. See
Robinson, supra note 38. The possibility of microchip implants to track the location of
children has been around for a while. See, e.g., Barbara J. King, Tag Him, Track Him, Hug
Him, Love Him, NPR (Nov. 7, 2013, 6:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/
2013/11/07/243268350/tag-him-track-him-hug-him-love-him
[https://perma.cc/PDV2SCH5]. For further reading on body implants, see Ben Popper, Cyborg America: Inside the
Strange New World of Basement Body Hackers, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2012, 10:37 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2012/8/8/3177438/cyborg-america-biohackers-grinders-bodyhackers [https://perma.cc/SZT3-DCQ8].
150
More than twenty years ago, Neil Howe and William Strauss argued that the Millennial
generation is the most “watched over generation in memory.” See NEIL HOWE &
WILLIAM STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING: THE NEXT GREAT GENERATION 9 (2000). For
examples of parental monitoring applications, see Ann Brenoff, Five Apps to Spy on Your
Kids Without Them Knowing, HUFFPOST (July 29, 2015, 7:59 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-to-track-your-kids-without-them-knowing-youreon-their-tail_n_55afaff1e4b07af29d56f544 [https://perma.cc/9MWR-ASXR]; Bernstein &
Triger, supra note 128, at 1238–39 (listingexamples of monitoring technologies).
151
See, e.g., Lupton & Williamson, supra note 144, at 786–89 (arguing that while
“dataveillance can be understood as a new form of ethical care provision,” it also carries
negativeramifications); Haber, supra note 15, at 450–53.
152
For statistics regarding parental monitoring of youth’s online behavior, see Monica
Anderson, Parents, Teens and Digital Monitoring, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 7, 2016),
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practically impossible given the volume of online activity across social media platforms, apps, search engines, and streaming websites.153 As mentioned, children might also be able to bypass parental surveillance measures.154
While surveillance may protect children from risks, it comes at
the price of infringing children’s well-being and fundamental
rights.155 There is no easy answer to the question of whether parental
monitoring negatively affects children, and if so, to what extent. Parental involvement in a child’s life is generally considered a good
thing156 and obtaining knowledge from one’s child directly has
proven advantageous for the child.157 But there is a difference between getting involved in a child’s life and spying on him.158
https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/07/parents-teens-and-digital-monitoring
[https://perma.cc/49MM-KYRN].
153
Some research indicates that many parents wish they had more forms of control over
theirchildren’s internet use. See, e.g., FAM. ONLINE SAFETY INST., supra note 112, at 6
(“56% [of parents] wish they had more control over content [their children see]; 42% wish
they had more control over time [their children spend online].”). See also PALFREY ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 34 (opining that “monitoring technologies are a useful tool to assist parents
and other responsible adults in determining their children’s access to appropriate Internet
content, particularly for younger children.”).
154
Children trying to avoid parental surveillance can do so in various ways. First, they
might use abbreviations or symbols their parents don’t understand. See Protecting Children
Online, supra note 28. Second, they can use other devices that are not monitored or use
technology to bypass parental surveillance. See PALFREY ET AL., supra note 21, at 34
(“Minors can circumvent these [filtering and monitoring] technologies most simply by
using the Internet at friends’ houses or in other places that do not use such technologies.
Also, many handheld devices, such as gaming devices, have WiFi capabilities, and
unsecured wireless networks can be accessed in the child’s bedroom, backyard, or
elsewhere, allowing for greater opportunity to bypass parental controls. Increasingly,
minors are also learning how to use proxies to circumvent filters or to reformat their
computers to remove parental controls.”).
155
See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156
There is a lively debate on the benefits and drawbacks of parental involvement,
especially in the field of education. See Kathleen V. Hoover-Dempsey & Howard M.
Sandler, Why Do Parents Become Involved in Their Children’s Education?, 67 REV. EDUC.
RSCH. 3, 3 (1997).
157
See generally Margaret Kerr & Håkan Stattin, What Parents Know, How They Know
It, and Several Forms of Adolescent Adjustment: Further Support for a Reinterpretation of
Monitoring, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 366 (2000) (showing through empirical study that
parents’ efforts cannot be effective when a child is not willing to share information).
158
See Haber, supra note 15, at 451–53 (noting that “promoting the use of sophisticated
spying devices for parents to discover their children’s secrets is not among the values
embedded in COPPA regulation . . . .”).
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To address these problems, two distinctions must be drawn. The
first distinction is between children aware of their parents’ monitoring, versus children who are unaware of any parental surveillance.
The second distinction is between full parental monitoring and partial parental monitoring—either monitoring some of the time, or
monitoring all the time but only on specific platforms.
Full parental monitoring sounds promising from a child safety
standpoint. If practical, such robust monitoring without the child’s
knowledge could eliminate any chance of concealed activity. Unlike
filtering software, this form of monitoring does not impede upon
children’s freedom of speech or information because it is ex post by
nature. The child can explore the digital world without ex ante limitations and only upon inappropriate behavior would parents decide
what to censor.
However, this is only partially accurate. Although parental monitoring does not prevent activity ex ante, it produces a severe chilling
effect.159 If a child discovers she is being monitored, even if she
agreed to it (perhaps to obtain permission from her parents to be
online),160 her freedom of expression and participatory rights are
threatened. Even if the child’s communications and explorations are
completely benign and appropriate, knowing about surveillance
leads to disengagement—chilling the freedom to explore, seek opportunities, and express oneself online—and infringing the right to
associate.161 This can stunt a child’s ability to develop a unique identity and worldview.

159

See Sidne Koenigsberg, Library Records Open to Parental Scrutiny: A New Set of
Internet Access Controls for Minors?, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 361, 375–76 (2006) (arguing
that parental access to children’s library records creates a chilling effect).
160
See generally Stephen Williams & Lynda Williams, Space Invaders: The Negotiation
of Teenage Boundaries Through the Mobile Phone, 53 SOCIO. REV. 314 (2005) (explaining
the use of mobile phones as a bargaining chip); Haddon, supra note 24, at 17 (stating that
there might be situations where children accept this checking as a sign of parental interest,
or else see it as a trade-off to obtain other rights).
161
See BENTLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 17. Research is inconsistent on whether being
watched encourages prosocial behavior and what affects this tendency. See, e.g., Stefanie
B. Northover et al., Artificial Surveillance Cues Do Not Increase Generosity: Two MetaAnalyses, 38 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 144 (2017). But see also Zoi Manesi et al., Eyes
Wide Open: Only Eyes that Pay Attention Promote Pro-Social Behavior, 2016
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCH., Apr. 14, 2016, at 1 (asserting that “eyes that pay attention,” the
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Parental monitoring can also negatively affect a child’s sense of
privacy and autonomy. Such comprehensive and thorough parental
monitoring creates the kinds of challenges associated with helicopter parenting.162 Like helicopter parenting, parental monitoring denies children privacy, not from external adversaries, but rather from
their parents.163 It lacks the necessary separation between children
and parents. Parents who are intertwined with every aspect of their
children’s lives curtail their children’s autonomy and hinder their
development of independence. These problems intensify as partial
monitoring becomes full parental surveillance; the spaces for autonomy and privacy for children shrink.
To a great extent, parental monitoring resembles Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon (an efficient prison architecture)—children who
are uncertain of whether they are being watched will always assume
they are.164 Though some children are risk averse,165 this model assumes that children will comply with rules because of a suspicion
they are being watched.166 In addition, when risky behavior goes undetected by parents engaging in robust monitoring, children may
wrongly deduce that certain behavior is safe and acceptable. This
false feeling of protection can result in increased exposure to risks
and harms.

social signals that remind of reputation, potentially facilitate individuals’ prosocial
behavior).
162
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
163
See Haber, supra note 15, at 443–53.
164
While Jeremy Bentham’s proposal suggested the panopticon design as a form of
efficient imprisoning, Michel Foucault later interpreted and developed this model and its
implications as a surveillance device. See generally Bert-Jaap Koops, Law, Technology,
and Shifting Power Relations, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 973 (2010) (explaining it is not the
act of being watched, but instead that at any moment one can be watched, that causes
people to internalize the watcher’s knowledge system and adapt their behaviors
accordingly).
165
Economic theory usually differentiates between those who are risk-neutral, riskpreferring, and risk-averse; each child, acting rationally, might act differently depending
on his or her preferences. For more on risk preferences, see generally DAVID HILLSON &
RUTH MURRAY-WEBSTER, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK ATTITUDE (2005)
(explaining how human factors such an individual’s objective and emotion can form a
different risk attitude than the others, resulting in differing risk management and
behaviors).
166
See Koops, supra note 164.
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Monitoring children without their awareness can be detrimental
to children’s rights and well-being. Undisclosed monitoring is
grounded in deception and can erode trust between parents and children.167 Further, invisible monitoring may hinder a child’s general
ability to trust168 and skew a child’s perception of privacy.169 It is a
misconception that digital natives do not care about their privacy.170
Research shows the opposite—children are keenly aware of their
online presentation and who is watching them.171 Adolescents are
especially preoccupied with maintaining privacy from adults as it
relates to certain activities.172
In sum, current parental monitoring options are inadequate to
address the problems relating to children’s well-being, liberties, and
privacy.173 Moreover, such modalities have proven largely ineffective.
167

See Kosse, supra note 77, at 775 (suggesting that parents using technology-based tools
for filtering content should explain the reasons for monitoring in advance); Haddon, supra
note 24 at 17 (“Arguably technical interventions in the form of filters and blocking . . . can
be taken to indicate a lack of trust—it is the equivalent of the imposition of a rule.”).
168
See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 128, at 1274–78.
169
For more on the normalization of surveillance, see David Murakami Wood & C.
William R. Webster, Living in Surveillance Societies: The Normalisation of Surveillance
in Europe and the Threat of Britain’s Bad Example, 5 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RSCH. 259 (2009).
170
Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2010, 8:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/
11/facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/PY6M-LGWV]. Mark Zuckerberg is not alone. Sun
Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy reportedly told a group of reporters and analysts in an
interview that, “[y]ou have zero privacy anyway. . . . [g]et over it.” See Polly Sprenger,
Sun on Privacy: Get Over It, WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/
1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it/ [https://perma.cc/4DKF-VB85].
171
See Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick, Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teen’s
Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies, in A DECADE IN INTERNET TIME: SYMPOSIUM ON THE
DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY 1 (Sept. 22, 2011) (“[T]eens have a sense of
privacy, although their definitions of privacy vary widely. Their practices in networked
publics are shaped by their interpretation of the social situation, their attitudes towards
privacy and publicity, and their ability to navigate the technological and social
environment.”).
172
See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42, at 109 (“An insta is ordinarily the truthful and
positive account that students create for themselves; their finsta—or fake insta—can be an
alternate identity, often harsher and edgier.”). This is sometimes related to testing out a
(sexual or other) identity for themselves when they perceive their environment as intolerant
of it. See id. at 66.
173
See BENTLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 5 (“After a decade of inaction, further selfregulation would simply not be a good enough response to the risks that children face.”).
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This Article suggests that technology has more to offer. It can
automatically detect risky behavior and notify parents or block
harmful content.174 In light of rapidly developing technology, AIbased solutions can simultaneously reduce online risks and the need
for parental intervention.175 Would such technology create substantial change in the way parents safeguard their children from online
risks? What are the benefits and drawbacks to children and parents
using this technology? What role should the law assume in regulating AI’s use and misuse? Part III introduces the shift toward algorithmic parenting and discusses these questions.
III. THE RISE OF ALGORITHMIC PARENTING
Automation is integrated into many aspects of life and “smart
devices” can be found everywhere.176 Children interact with smart
devices in the forms of connected toys, AI devices that serve as tutors, cellphones, and more.177 These devices could alter the ways
parents protect their children, monitor them, and even make decisions on behalf of their children. Identified as algorithmic parenting
herein, this novel phenomenon is relatively new to literature concerning both parenting and technology.178
To understand the ramifications of a transition to algorithmic
parenting and the law’s role in appropriately shaping this model, this
Part will first introduce algorithmic parenting and discuss the potential benefits and drawbacks. Second, it will evaluate the normative
174

See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Online Child Sex Offenders: Challenges and CounterMeasures, 52 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 190, 197–98 (2013) (listing examples of parental control
technologies).
175
See infra Part III.
176
For more on automation and smart devices, see Eldar Haber, The Wiretapping of
Things, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 733, 745–47 (2019).
177
Aside from connected toys, if a child lives in a so-called “smarthome,” then she is
surrounded by internet-connected devices and it will be difficult for her to notinteract with
devices that are constantly connected to the internet. The child might use them for various
reasons, like asking questions, playing music, or play games. In addition, a child might also
gain online access in their school or in places where they engage in extracurricular
activities. For more on children’s interactions with IoT devices, see generally Haber, supra
note 15.
178
For another proposition that we use AI to protect children from online harms, see
BENTLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 25–27.
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reasons for legal intervention in algorithmic parenting and the execution of such intervention.
A. Defining Algorithmic Parenting
As used in this Article, algorithmic parenting refers to a parent’s
use of AI algorithms in parental practices. It can involve a parent
monitoring data from specific social media platforms through addon installations.179 It can also take the form of a parent collecting
information about every aspect of a child’s online behavior on social
media platforms, search engines, mailing applications, games, and
smart toys. Analyzing this data could provide information on every
detail of raising a child—from nutrition and health to educational
development and social activities. Computational capabilities, such
as natural language processing180 and analysis of metadata and media, could potentially allow AI algorithms to “sense” when a child’s
online communication may be inappropriate, risky, or indicative of
distress. When the AI detects suspicious communication or indicates
a child may be facing risk, it would notify the parent, who decides
how to tackle the problem from there. In extreme cases where the
AI detects specific harmful content, the system could simultaneously block the content and alert the parent.181
AI monitoring technologies can have many features embedded
to further reduce risks to children. For instance, the algorithm might
include a feature that recognizes forms of personal identifiable information and report when a child communicates such information

179

For a survey of parental add-ons, see Ben Moore & Kim Key, The Best Parental
Control Software for 2021, PCMAG, https://www.pcmag.com/picks/the-best-parentalcontrol-software [https://perma.cc/N799-AVYJ] (Aug. 2, 2021).
180
Natural language processing is “a form of AI that extracts meaning from human
language to make decisions based on the information.” For recent examples of natural
language processing as applied in practice, see Bernard Marr, Five Amazing Examples of
Natural Language Processing (NLP) in Practice, FORBES (June 3, 2019, 12:23 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/06/03/5-amazing-examples-of-naturallanguage-processing-nlp-in-practice/#66b63e671b30 [https://perma.cc/8YEF-EBWP].
181
Extreme cases could be those that clearly fall outside the First Amendment’s scope,
such as child pornography and obscenity. For more on the exceptions to protected speech,
see KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EB7-E5AR].
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through a device.182 Another possible feature is the identification of
websites that contain harmful or age-inappropriate materials,183
much like labeling systems for movies and television based on content.184 AI algorithms may even detect the use of symbols, emojis,
and covert communications harmful to children and alert parents,
facilitating their ability to protect children from cyberbullying.
Unlike full parental monitoring, parental notification via AI
could be designed to respect children’s privacy. For example, the
system need not disclose the specific content triggering an alert. Instead, the AI could include several pre-defined categories of risk—
such as disclosure of sensitive information, explicit sexual content,
metadata or content analysis indicating emotional distress, and excessive or irregular hours of online activity—and alert a parent that
one or more of these categories had been detected. Parents would
then have the choice to talk to their children and share concerns.
This option alerts parents to activities they cannot see while leaving
children to decide how much detail to share with their parents
through direct communication. This constitutes a significant departure from helicopter parenting and full online parental monitoring
without abandoning a parent’s duty to safeguard children.
Technologically, the tools that can enable algorithmic parenting
are already in use and are expected to become readily available due
to AI developments.185 Studies show that data analysis from social

182

Exceptions to this rule could be set—when, for instance, the information is shared
with a whitelisted person.
183
Kevin Saunders proposed making it possible for anyone who posts things online to
choose whether to make the content available to everyone or just to adults. Under this
proposition, if the content contains a signal, parents who have filtering software could
block the content. See Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First
Amendment to Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257, 259
(2004).
184
These include G (General Audiences), PG (Parental Guidance Suggested), PG-13
(Parents Strongly Cautioned), R (Restricted), and NC-17 (Adults Only). See Film Ratings,
MOTION PICTURES ASS’N, https://www.motionpictures.org/film-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/
CH4Z-VCHT]; Etzioni, supra note 61, at 24–25.
185
Several companies are currently advancing the use of AI, along with big data analysis,
to provide better monitoring tools for parents—for instance, CUJO AI, which has parental
control mechanisms for parents. See e.g., CUJO AI, https://cujo.com
[https://perma.cc/8TNG-ESV4]; Rehan Ijaz, Big Data Simplifies Child Monitoring in an
Age
of
New
Safety
Concerns,
SMARTDATA
COLLECTIVE,
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media platforms can accurately detect and predict suicidal ideations,186 eating disorders,187 and depression.188 These studies used
data from a single social media platform, implying that algorithms
with access to data from multiple sources would be even more accurate, including social media, search engines, and metadata concerning duration and hours of use. Accuracy improves through accumulation of data over time, which would enable further detection
of changes and irregular behavior indicating distress or onset of crisis.189
https://www.smartdatacollective.com/big-data-simplifies-child-monitoring-in-an-age-ofnew-safety-concerns [https://perma.cc/8WP2-JB87]; Cathy Habas, The Best Parental
Control Apps of 2021, SAFEWISE (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.safewise.com/
resources/parental-control-filters-buyers-guide [https://perma.cc/4SDF-3XF8]. Another
example is the Keepers app, which “allows you to monitor children’s online activity, detect
surprises behaviors and monitor their digital wellbeing—without invading your child’s
privacy” by monitoring “incoming and outgoing messaging on social media platforms,
automatically tracking any suspicious, abusive, or inappropriate content, by referencing
our
smart,
up-to-date
phrases
detection
database.”
See
KEEPERS,
https://www.keeperschildsafety.net [https://perma.cc/2TBK-23VF].
186
See generally Ramit Sawhney et al., Exploring and Learning Suicidal Ideation
Connotations on Social Media with Deep Learning, in Proceedings of the 9th Workshop
on Computational Approaches to Subjectivity, Sentiment and Social Media Analysis 167
(2018) (reviewing current capabilities of deep learning systems to build models for suicidal
ideation detection); Bart Desmet & Veronique Host, Recognising Suicidal Messages in
Dutch Social Media, in LREC 2014, Ninth International Conference on Language
Resources and Evaluation 833 (2014).
187
See generally Hao Yan et al., Automatic Detection of Eating Disorder‐Related Social
Media Posts That Could Benefit from a Mental Health Intervention, 52 INT’L. J. EATING
DISORDERS 1150 (2019) (discussing a mistake rate of four percent in determining which
posts were most in need of professional intervention).
188
See generally Munmun de Choudhury et al., Predicting Depression via Social Media,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 128 (2013). One
study examined 476 Twitter users’ activity in the year preceding the onset of a major
depression episode and was able to identify user behavior associated with depression
including content shared, hours of activity, decreased level of interaction, and focus on the
use first-person pronouns. Id. at 133. The predictive model was able to accurately predict
depression in 70% of cases. Id. at 135. On the other hand, a review of twenty-two studies
concerning automatic detection of cyber bullying revealed less reason for optimism. See
H. Rosa et al., Automatic Cyberbullying Detection: A Systemic Review, 93 COMPUTS. IN
HUM. BEHAV. 333, 344 (2019) (explaining that definitions of cyberbullying used in these
studies were often inaccurate, the quality of datasets was insufficient, and there were other
methodological shortcomings).
189
See generally Munmun de Choudhury et al., Predicting Postpartum Changes in
Behavior and Mood via Social Media, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON
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A critical consideration regarding the algorithm’s design is what
level of risk to report to parents. Models can be designed in a stable
and predictable manner to be sensitive and lower the bar for labeling
risky content. This would decrease the likelihood of harms and risks
going undetected and create more false positives. Setting such a
standard would result in the algorithm reporting any disagreement
the child has in a chat and all instances of individuals “unfollowing”
the child’s social media profile. These social interactions, while
surely unpleasant for children, do not necessarily require parental
intervention.
Oversensitive algorithms may also be counterproductive. Recall
one of Aesop’s fables, “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” If the algorithm
floods parents with superfluous alerts, parents may stop taking them
seriously and even turn them off, thereby defeating the purpose and
potentially missing an alert warning of real danger to their child.
An algorithm designed to detect the most severe risks is beneficial for another reason. In response to “over-parenting” trends, experts recommend parenting strategies that are not based on surveillance, but instead involve dialogue, communication, and trust.190 Algorithms that detect only severe cases maintain education and dialogue as the main parental strategy, with the algorithm merely acting
as a supplement so parents do not miss something important. This
also ensures that children do not miss something important because
education is not always sufficient in circumstances where a child is
unaware of the danger he is facing.191

HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (2013) (generating a predictive model for new
mothers’ postpartum mood changes using social media); Myoungouk Park et al.,
Depressive Moods of Users Captured in Twitter, in ACM SIGKDD WORKSHOP ON
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (2012) (studying whether word choice on Twitter between
depressed users and non-depressed users varied); Nikhita Vedula & Srinivasan
Parthasarathy, Emotional and Linguistic Cues of Depression from Social Media, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL HEALTH 127 (2017)
(discussing research examining Twitter users for postpartum depression that was 70%
predictive, with the rate rising to 83% if prenatal information was also included).
190
For more on the importance of education in this context, see Kosse, supra note 77, at
774; PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42.
191
Thus, education will be almost useless against sophisticated adversaries disguised as
trusted parties. See, e.g., Awais Rashid et al., Isis: Protecting Children in Online Social
Networks, in ADVANCES IN THE ANALYSIS OF ONLINE PAEDOPHILE ACTIVITY (2009)
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Open communication is desirable because even in its best form,
AI is unable to offer bulletproof protection against all online risks.
Even assuming the algorithm could perfectly detect harmful online
communication, the AI would not be of much help in instances of
hackers gaining unauthorized access to a child’s device or other
types of deception.192 In addition, bullying and harassment does not
always contain explicit words, and interpreting language requires
context.193 Ideally, the algorithm would learn to become sensitive to
consequential changes in habits that may indicate distress. Therefore, the combination of both strategies is optimal.
Regarding the parent-child relationship, algorithmic parenting is
a better option than partial or full parental monitoring, blocking content, or doing nothing. As discussed in Part B, parental monitoring
negatively affects the parent-child relationship and disrupts the trust
in which it is grounded. Algorithmic parenting does not raise the
same concerns because children are not under full parental surveillance. The algorithm alerts parents to their children’s activity only
when it recognizes cause for concern. The AI would not share the
child’s communications with parents when the child is simply sharing secrets with his best friend, or when teenagers are taking their
first romantic steps.194
Further, algorithmic parenting has potential to strengthen the
parent-child relationship. Even parents with high levels of awareness may find it difficult to have open, honest conversations about
difficult topics with their children. These conversations are sometimes embarrassing and uncomfortable and both parents and children likely prefer to have as few of them as possible or even avoid
them altogether. Algorithmic parenting would nudge parents to have
(“Pedophiles and other child sex offenders often masquerade as children in order to
establish contact with potential victims and gain their trust.”).
192
Think of a hacked smart toy, which communicates with a child, asking questions or
asking the child to act on his behalf, without the child knowing that the toy is hacked. See
Haber, supra note 15, at 401.
193
See PALFREY ET AL., supra note 21, at 33 (“[O]ften the distinction between content
that is part of social discourse and that which is harmful is context-dependent and
technology is unlikely to be able to effectively recognize the “rumors” and “gossip” that
make up the bulk of online harassment.”).
194
Unless, of course, the algorithm recognizes some of this content as inappropriate or
risky in other ways.
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these conversations when parents inevitably receive an alert. While
the alerts may turn out to be of little concern, they will encourage
parents to speak with children about safe and ethical online behavior.
Another advantage of algorithmic parenting speaks to parents’
challenge of maintaining a close, open relationship with their children. AI algorithms used for detecting online risks can offer protection for children whose parents are incapable of engaging in dialogue. Nurturing open conversations with children can be demanding, and some parents lack the time or skill to successfully do so.195
Relationships also have their ups and downs, and even parents and
children with meaningful, open relationships may go through times
when children are reluctant to share their worries and dilemmas with
their parents. Algorithmic parenting would provide a safety net to
handle these concerns.
Algorithmic parenting can mitigate the current gaps and inequality in the way parents safeguard children from online harm, either
through monitoring or education. Assuming that the software’s installation and use is not prohibitively expensive or complicated, this
safety measure could enable more parents to get involved in their
children’s online safety. We recognize that some parents are better
equipped than others to use platforms as an opportunity to have open
and educational conversations with their children. Nonetheless, the
platform would offer even the least sophisticated users protection
from severe online harms.
There are, however, several worries surrounding the effectiveness of AI algorithms for promoting children’s safety. First, as noted
above, algorithms may not be able to detect all cases of online
risk.196 Second, shielding children from risks or “bad” things, much
like the aforementioned Black Mirror “Arkangel” episode, could arguably constitute overprotection.197 It hinders a child’s preparation
for the real world. Further, there is concern that children will find
ways to bypass the algorithm, use other devices, or conceal certain
195

See generally PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42 (acknowledging the difficulty of
engaging in connected parenting).
196
See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
197
See Robinson, supra note 38.
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activities from the algorithm, especially those activities children
think parents will object to.198
Another foreseeable issue is that parents may lower their personal levels of alertness to their children by relying too heavily on
AI monitoring. Parents may assume that as long as the algorithm
does not notify them, everything is in order. Further, parents may
interpret historically concerning patterns, such as withdrawal, mood
swings, or changes in appetite, as typical adolescent behavior rather
than relying on intuition and taking action.
This feeds into a philosophical concern that using algorithms to
monitor children’s online activity delegates parental care to a machine. One of the most fundamental aspects of parenting is being the
keeper of the child—the person responsible for the child thriving.199
Worrying is not merely a side effect of parenting; rather, it is a functional pillar of parenting. Algorithmic parenting entails moving this
responsibility to a third party—one that isn’t even human. This can
be counterproductive, and the problem of outsourcing care runs
deeper than its effect: it might weaken the emotional bond between
parents and children.200 Parents foster an intimate parent-child relationship by trying to figure out, through conversation and other interaction, what a child is going through, how he feels, and what is
on his mind. Besides enriching the parent-child relationship,

198

One might argue that children will simply find technological ways to bypass the
mechanism, for example, by connecting to a wireless network or, at some age, purchasing
sim cards without parental safeguards. It is debatable, however, how prevalent that may be
and there might also be some form of a tradeoff between children’s abilities to bypass their
parent’s apps and the children’s ability and maturity to better handle harmful
communication.
199
HARRY BRIGHOUSE & ADAM SWIFT, FAMILY VALUES: THE ETHICS OF PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIPS 88 (2014). (“The parent is charged with responsibility for both the
immediate well-being of the child and the development of the child’s capacities . . . the
child has immediate interests in being kept safe, enjoying herself, being sheltered and well
nourished, having loving relationships with proximate others, and so on . . . .The parents’
fiduciary duties are to guarantee the child’s immediate well-being . . . and to oversee her
cognitive, emotional, physical, and moral development.”).
200
See Max van Manen, Care as Worry or “Don’t Worry Be Happy,” 12 QUALITATIVE
HEALTH RSCH. 262, 264 (2002) (“Worry is the active ingredient of parental attentiveness.
Worry—rather than duty or obligation—keeps us in touch with the one for whom we care.
Worry is the spiritual glue that keeps the mother or father affixed to the life of their child.”).
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concern for children’s well-being is an important evolutionary tool
that facilitates children’s survival.201
To partially address these concerns and protect themselves from
user dissatisfaction and legal challenges, platforms could explicitly
warn users that they do not offer full protection and should be treated
as an auxiliary parenting aide. Of course, this solution is limited because parents might overlook or misunderstand such warnings.
Thus, effectiveness is critical for adopting algorithmic parenting
as a panacea to mitigate the digital world’s inherent risks and harms.
However, we believe this form of parenting is beneficial for more
than just its effectiveness—it would also respect children’s rights
and liberties and, therefore, should be promoted by the state and private companies.
B. Algorithmic Parenting and Children’s Rights and Liberties
There is no magic path to good parenting in the digital age. However, algorithmic parenting is a promising candidate for minimizing
online risks facing children in the quickly-evolving digital age. Full
exploration of this parenting style requires balancing the value of
safety it provides against the potential implications for children’s
rights and liberties. This Part argues that algorithmic parenting can
and should be designed to minimize such impositions.
Under the AI system, children’s freedom of speech and freedom
of information may be threatened. Mistakes made by automated systems might lead to reporting and blocking benign or beneficial content. For example, an algorithm programmed to block sexual content
might prevent a child from accessing information about the human
body or viewing works of art.202 This issue would also arise if a child
browses sites about sexual health he does not want his parents to
know about. This is particularly important to young people, especially as it relates to LGBTQ youth who typically lack alternative
201

See Robert Plutchik, The Nature of Emotions: Human Emotions Have Deep
Evolutionary Roots, a Fact that May Explain Their Complexity and Provide Tools for
Clinical Practice, 89 AM. SCIENTIST 344, 345 (2001) (“Those . . . studying the evolutionary
origins of emotion have sought to understand how emotions increase evolutionary fitness
for the individual. . . . Fear and anxiety in people closely parallel the state of heightened
arousal of an animal who senses a predator or a threat to its offspring.”).
202
See Garfield, supra note 142.
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sources of helpful, open-minded, and reliable information.203 Such
censorship raises free speech concerns and would likely face constitutional challenges if state-mandated.204 It would also prevent children from accessing certain information instrumental to a child’s development of identity and belief structure, allowing a child to shape
his worldview, engage in activism, and connect with like-minded
people.205 Restrictions can inhibit a child’s sense of and right to autonomy.
Foreseeable constitutional challenges may be a major barrier to
legal intervention. In the context of regulating child protection
online, the First Amendment has been invoked when a law incidentally denied adults’ access to protected speech.206 However, because these algorithms only target the child, impact on adults’ First
Amendment rights are of little concern. Other First Amendment issues that are often raised in the context of filtering technologies include prior restraint and compelled speech.207 However, the algorithm can be designed to merely flag content rather than block access to it. This would alleviate any First Amendment concerns, even
if algorithmic parenting becomes mandatory in certain cases—an
option that will be explored below.
Additionally, the AI can be programmed to create and maintain
an updated list of websites deemed high-quality resources for children to learn about sexuality and sexual identity. Content accessed

203

See BENTLEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
As previously noted, Congress sought to regulate the exposure of children to
inappropriate materials online by enacting the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) that
eventually failed to pass constitutional muster since it placed an impermissible “burden”
on speech. See Child Online Protection Act, supra note 103.
205
See Koenigsberg, supra note 159, at 375.
206
For more on free speech and the child-parent relationship, see generally KEVIN W.
SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2003); Catherine J.
Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from
Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427 (2000); Garfield, supra note 142.
207
“Prior restraint” refers to a governmental prohibition on speech ex-ante—something
that does not occur under the algorithmic parenting model. “Compelled speech” rights
could be somewhat summarized as a right not to speak or not to be forced to express
yourself. For more on compelled speech, see, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
796–97 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
204
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on these websites would not trigger the algorithm without additional
indications of risk.208
Children’s right to privacy is another important consideration.
In its most comprehensive form, algorithmic parenting might involve collecting and analyzing data created by children’s online activity. Companies would likely perform the process of data-mining,
its analysis, and its retention. This creates a rather obvious risk: children’s data might be used to further the company’s commercial
goals. Even if companies do not monetize such data, the servers that
store this data could be breached or otherwise comprised, and the
data could be released publicly, risking use for malicious purposes.209 While these concerns are not unique to algorithmic parenting, the scope of collectable and assessable data could be huge, raising acute worries. As detailed in Part A, the current regulatory regime is insufficient to contend with this challenge, and legislators
would have to reconfigure the current legal framework.210
The most critical and challenging privacy-related concern related to algorithmic parenting involves how much access parents
should have to children’s online activities and communications. Algorithms would be able to monitor a child’s every click and assess
activities, searching for signs of inappropriate behavior and indications of distress. The fact that these indications would be sent to
children’s parents raises clear privacy issues.
Some parents might condition the ability to go online, use a mobile device, or open a social media account on installing a monitoring application, so children might be under pressure to waive their
privacy. Therefore, making children aware that monitoring takes
place does not rectify privacy concerns. In turn, the extent of invasion of children’s privacy should be minimized in advance. Algorithmic parenting could be designed to minimize privacy violations
and offer children a relatively undisturbed online experience. Possible elements the design include limiting intervention to activity that

208

For example, searching for information about sexual identity on a whitelisted website
together with other indications might justify mental health concerns related to sexuality.
209
See Haber, supra note 15, at 423.
210
For one suggestion on how to recalibrate COPPA, see Haber, supra note 15, at 428–
43.
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crosses a high threshold of risk and alerting parents only to the existence of seriously risky behavior. In addition, the design could
limit the kind of information parents receive and leave children with
the discretion to share the content itself with their parents.211
A final and more philosophical, privacy-related concern is
whether AI’s ability to fully access children’s online activity constitutes an invasion of privacy. In other words, assuming the algorithm
is independent, is the fact that the algorithm “knows” things about
children a violation of privacy, or does such an infringement require
human sentience and cognition?212
All in all, we find that, alongside more traditional practices of
parental mediation and education, algorithmic parenting offers substantial benefits to children’s safety. It protects children’s liberties
and privacy better than common parenting practices such as partial
or full parental monitoring, content-blocking, or screen time limitations. Algorithmic parenting is also compatible with parenting styles
that focus on fostering relationships of trust and open communication. As a result, a transition to algorithmic parenting is desirable for
children’s protection, well-being, and rights.
C. Regulating Algorithmic Parenting
Algorithmic parenting could pave the path for increased online
safety for children. If safety-enhancing algorithms become ubiquitous, lawmakers must address new challenges that will arise. This
section focuses on two such issues. The first is how to regulate algorithmic parenting and its design, marketing, and operation by
commercial companies. The second is whether regulators should
play a role in ensuring access to algorithmic parenting, especially
for children from disadvantaged backgrounds who are more prone
to both general and digital risks. The natural solution is direct legal
intervention. Although there may be reluctance for the government

211

Parents can undoubtedly put significant pressure on their children to share content.
This, however, is not unique to the online world; it can happen in relation to any secret a
child is pressured to disclose.
212
Ian Kerr argued that robots and AIs that operate independently of human intervention
can, and in some cases do, diminish our privacy. See generally Ian Kerr, Schrödinger’s
Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123 (2019).
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to provide the service itself,213 the state should create incentives for
companies to develop appropriate AI algorithms and subsequently
encourage people to use them properly.
The first challenge involves regulating the design, marketing,
and operation of parental AI algorithms. If parental demand for such
services is insufficient for development in the market, the state
should push and incentivize companies to voluntarily provide such
tools by design.214 It is preferable to have an indirect government
approach that would influence—rather than oblige—the development, implementation, and education of algorithmic parenting technologies.215 This can take the form of incentives such as subsidies
or tax benefits.216 The government must carefully tailor such incentives to avoid the appearance of engaging in covert activity that violates constitutional rights.217

213

This argument links to what we came to learn from Edward Snowden’s revelations
about the state’s misuse of its powers. To clarify, it is not the fear of the state learning about
what constitutes harmful communication, as such data might not be sensitive per se, but
rather that algorithmic parenting tools could enable its controller to obtain data on what
children are doing online. For more on the problems of procedural safeguards and
governmental misuse of its powers in the context of national security, see generally Niva
Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to Civil Liberties,
82 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2017).
214
One might argue that the Supreme Court encouraged Congress to grant parents
filtering tools—which could be interpreted as monitoring tools as well. In the words of
Justice Kennedy, “[b]y enacting programs to promote use of filtering software . . . “ such
as the ability to monitor what their children see, “Congress could give parents that ability
without subjecting protected speech to severe penalties.” See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S.
656, 670 (2004).
215
See Wagner, supra note 139, at 777–801 (discussing indirect government approaches
that could pass constitutional muster).
216
The main challenge here would be whether the government violates the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, by which the state is forbidden from conditioning the
receipt of benefits on a waiver of a constitutionally protected right. For further reading on
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675 (1992); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
217
See Balkin, supra note 138, at 1159. Another solution might be to impose liability for
not mitigating online risks for children. Under a limited liability regime, intermediaries that
do not provide algorithmic parenting services could be held legally responsible for not
identifying reasonably foreseeable risks to children when these risks accumulate to actual
harm. But this solution might also raise constitutional issues.
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Policymakers must also tackle the negative impact of algorithmic parenting on children’s rights. The underlying rationale is similar to the policy underlying COPPA.218 However, even though
COPPA could be applied within certain AI platforms,219 it is far too
limited to mitigate the drawbacks of algorithmic parenting and necessitates additional legal protections for children.
The legal framework that would govern how private companies
construct and operate their algorithms must first address potential
security risks stemming from technology.220 Policymakers should
require that companies providing algorithmic parenting services adhere to adequate cybersecurity measures, protecting the platform
and stored data. It is crucial that the system be as difficult to hack as
possible. Platforms should implement security measures capable of
detecting when the system or data has been compromised. In tandem
with security measures,221 companies should include features capable of detecting deviations from its preset preferences. While this
would not prevent every unauthorized access, it would reduce the
overall possibility of harm.
However, the impact on human rights and liberties must not
solely rest in the realm of privately owned platforms.222
218

COPPA was crafted to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with
personal information from and about children on the internet. See Garber, supra note 15,
at 153.
219
See Haber, supra note 74, at 1232 (“While COPPA might apply to some IoT devices,
like IoToys, it will fail to apply to many other IoT devices that will effectively be used by
children under the age of thirteen.”).
220
See Memorandum from UC Berkeley Hum. Rts. Ctr. Rsch. Team on A.I. and Child
Rts. to A.I. and Child Rts. Working Grp. 63 (Apr. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Memorandum on
A.I. and Child Rts.] (available at https://www.unicef.org/innovation/media/10501/
file/Memorandum%20on%20Artificial%20Intelligence%20and%20Child%20Rights.pdfa
t [https://perma.cc/4PK8-SMSC]) (suggesting that policymakers must “[a]dopt a clear,
comprehensive framework for corporations that imposes a duty of care connected to the
handling of children’s data, and provides an effective remedy (judicial, administrative or
other) for breach.”).
221
For more on the risks of poor security measures, see generally BRUCE SCHNEIER,
CLICK HERE TO KILL EVERYBODY: SECURITY AND SURVIVAL IN A HYPER-CONNECTED
WORLD (2018).
222
See Memorandum on A.I. and Child Rts., supra note 220, at 1 (“As much of the
underlying technology is proprietary to corporations, corporations’ willingness and ability
to incorporate human rights considerations into the development and use of such
technologies will be critical.”).
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Policymakers must be prepared to tackle the negative consequences
of algorithmic parenting by establishing a new framework for its
proper use. The rationales undergirding child protection laws, such
as COPPA,223 must be applied here in a stricter form. Such data collection should not be allowed for any reason other than machine
learning purposes and should lack identifying attributions. To avoid
data-mining, the algorithm should prioritize using the endless data
that is widely and freely available online to study inappropriate content or behavior. However, to work optimally, AI will need to learn
from children using the particular platform and adapt to swift social
changes. Thus, databases should store little to no personally identifiable data on children. This should not affect the algorithm’s precision, because the algorithm merely needs to learn what constitutes
risky behavior for each relevant age.
Otherwise, any preferences or data derived directly from children must be kept only locally (i.e., on the child’s or parent’s device). Here, too, the risk of a privacy violation is considerably low
within the context of such data-mining. Eventually, if risks of exploiting such databases grow, it would still be advisable to require
databases to implement strong and frequently-updated security
measures and other forms of privacy enhancement techniques.224
Another concern might arise from the fact that many AI services
are essentially proprietary black boxes—the algorithm is not revealed.225 Therefore, platforms labeling behavior as inappropriate
223

See Haber, supra note 15, at 446 (“The main rationale behind COPPA was not to
foster parental surveillance of their children online but to aid parents who wanted their
children to take advantage of the internet, while obtaining better control of the practices of
the websites they visited and the information requested from them.”).
224
One potential solution is differential privacy—a mathematical method that strives to
assure that the presence or absence of an individual in a dataset does not make any
significant difference to the outcome of database queries. For more on differential privacy,
see Cynthia Dwork et al., Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis, in
THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY CONFERENCE 265 (Shai Halevi & Tal Rabin eds., 2006);
Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMMC’NS ACM, no.
1, at 86, 91 (2011); see generally Dan Feldman & Eldar Haber, Measuring and Protecting
Privacy in the Always-On Era, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 197 (2020) (suggesting
computational solutions to protect privacy in the context of IoT devices).
225
See Jay Stanley, The Privacy Threat from Always-On Microphones Like the Amazon
Echo, ACLU (Jan. 13, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/
privacy-threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo?redirect=blog/free-future/privacy-
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could shape children’s behavior and social norms with little or no
external oversight. While feedback from parents signaling whether
an alert was justified or not might ease some of the concern, this is
not altogether the case. Analogizing to a different context, algorithms may replicate social prejudice and discrimination when assisting employers in choosing prospective employees or when used
by law enforcement agencies or insurance companies.226 The same
might be true of child protection algorithms that perceive language
associated with certain social groups as more likely to be risky, to
give but one example.
Lacking the ability to understand how these platforms operate
necessitates effective oversight of the technology’s use and implementation. While oversight mechanisms should always be part of
the law, it is especially crucial when it comes to AI and children’s
rights. Oversight must be transparent, articulating clear and ethical
rules about the data collected and its storage, access, and potential
use. The algorithm itself must also be transparent.227
Another necessary change to the COPPA framework is applying
the law to children above the age of thirteen.228 This Article will not
take a strong position regarding the exact age cutoff of legal protections for children. The age limit will depend, inter alia, on developing social perceptions of childhood, but even more importantly on
parental discretion regarding when to discontinue using this form of
protection.229 However, when policymakers draw the line, they must
account for an adaptive framework to accommodate changes in the
threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/RNR2-F8CH]. For more on AI
as black boxes, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
226
See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. 671 (2016) (discussing unintentional discrimination arising from algorithmic
computing techniques); Carmel & Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 91.
227
See Alexa Hasse et al., Youth and Artificial Intelligence: Where We Stand, BERKMAN
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 7 (2019), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/
40268058/2019-05_YouthAndAI.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/N5NS-PPC9] (“There is a risk of undermining youth privacy if the
companies that design AI-fueled technologies are not clear and ethical about how they
collect user data, where that data is stored, who can access it, and what can be done with
it.”).
228
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2; 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1).
229
See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 61, at 42–47 (discussing children’s age and maturity).
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risks that children face online according to their age.230 In any case,
the current threshold of age thirteen falls short of sufficient online
privacy regulation of children within the context of algorithmic parenting.231
In addition to regulating the companies creating, marketing, and
operating the algorithm, regulation should be directed toward other
relevant actors, namely the platforms and companies who grant
online services. Because children and adolescents use many of these
platforms, it is important to cover their activities on these platforms.232 However, companies and platforms are disincentivized to
operate in a manner that might make them less attractive to users.
Another issue involves discerning which profiles belong to children when reporting risky content on social media or search engines.
When devices are used by more than one person, such as a computer
230

In this respect, there should be differences between early childhood (ages three to
five), childhood (ages six to nine), preadolescence (ages ten to twelve), early adolescence
(ages thirteen to fifteen), and if applicable at all, late adolescence (ages sixteen to eighteen).
For this dichotomy, see YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 116–17 (Dick
Thornburgh & Hebert S. Lin eds., 2002). We might want to think of situations where social
childhood is extended, with people living with their parents past age eighteen, and where
some parental functions may, therefore, continue past age eighteen. See Richard A.
Settersten Jr. & Barbara Ray, What’s Going on With Young People Today? The Long and
Twisting Road to Adulthood, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 2010, at 19, 20 (2010) (stating
that “[t]he process of becoming an adult is more gradual and varied today[;] . . . young
people are taking longer to achieve economic and psychological autonomy.”).
231
For example, it is estimated that more than seventy percent of parents in the United
States cease supervision of internet use by their children after the age of fourteen, while
statistics show that most internet-related missing children cases involve children fifteen or
older. See Protecting Children Online, supra note 28. But it should also not be set too high,
as it is crucial for youth (and children) to make mistakes, and parents should be cautioned
against too much parental control that could undermine their safety goals by harming their
children’s development of autonomy. To clarify, algorithmic parenting should be flexible
and account for age differences. Sexual content at the age of sixteen is not as harmful as at
the age of eight. And at some developmental stage, it becomes important for children to
explore and learn, within their capabilities and appetites, and any form of parental
monitoring could be devastating to them.
232
See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 172, at 35 (citing a 2018 study of teenage
engagement online in which forty-five percent of participants said they used the internet
“almost constantly”); see also Brooke Auxier et al., Parenting Children in the Age of
Screens, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 28, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2020/07/28/parenting-children-in-the-age-of-screens/
[https://perma.cc/A6KA-LSEN]
(offering data concerning use of digital devices and platforms—for example 80% of
parents reported their children watch content on YouTube).
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used in the family’s home, it would be difficult to know what use to
attribute to which family member. This could also cause unintentional surveillance of certain persons, resulting in privacy issues.
Algorithms that are installed as add-ons to a specific application,
such as a social media account, are even more problematic in this
regard, since children can set up their profiles without disclosing
their age.233 Even when platforms know of age, they typically do not
have parents’ contact information. Therefore, limited legal duties
should be placed on platforms (such as social media, messaging
apps, etc.), and instead could include, at the most, a duty to disclose
children’s data upon a validated request by parents or other legal
guardians.
Accordingly, incorporating AI algorithms to protect children
against online harm would depend on parents being aware of both
the online risks and technological solutions, and being able to ensure
that the child’s significant activity is covered. As pointed out
above,234 this ability is not trivial, and therefore some children who
perhaps need it most might be left unprotected. This leads to the
second issue policymakers would need to address: making algorithmic parenting accessible to all.
As technology develops, parents are increasingly seeking ways
to protect their children from online dangers, and the market responds to this demand.235 Assuming these solutions will not be prohibitively expensive (and regulation could ensure they are not), algorithmic parenting could very quickly be used in every household.
However, as with other parenting trends, not all parents would be
equally on board. This creates a clear and wide divide between children in different circumstances.
This is not a complete legal void. Parents have a legal duty to
care for their children, and abuse or neglect of children is a crime.236
Criminal law imposes duties on parents to intervene in cases when

233

Alternatively, children may set up an “official” profile and a second, secret profile of
which parents are unaware. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
234
See supra Part II.B.
235
For examples of such market responses, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
236
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106g.
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they know that children are at risk from a third party.237 Parents, for
example, have been charged when leaving a child with a known sexual offender or abusive father, or charged with manslaughter when
failure to provide medical care resulted in a child’s death.238 However, this applies to harm caused by third parties and not to selfinflicted harm.239 Additionally, it does not necessarily impose duties
to actively seek this information, for example, by monitoring children’s communications. And while there is something to be said for
widening parents’ responsibilities,240 it seems that liability will remain confined to cases of severe neglect.241 Therefore, current doctrine is unlikely to impose additional criminal liability on parents in
relation to children’s online risks.
Tort liability is also not a promising source of parental duties to
reduce online risks. Doctrine regarding parental autonomy renders
parents practically immune from tort liability in cases of harm to
children.242 Most states have enacted statutes making parents liable
for children’s torts.243 Yet despite these statutes, imposition of civil

237

See Laura King, Note, Damned If You Do: The Rational Parent’s Quandary Under
Criminal Failure-to-Protect Statutes, 13 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 121, 125–26 (2018). Twentynine states have enacted specific failure-to-protect statutes, and another nineteen have more
general provisions that have basically the same effect. Id. at 126.
238
See Johnson & Hargrove, supra note 5, at 313.
239
See generally Vanessa Gardianos, Note, Adolescent Suicide: A Call for Parental
Liability, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 201 (2009) (arguing that parents should be
liable when they fail to prevent their children’s suicide).
240
Id.
241
See King, supra note 237 (advocating for failure-to-protect legislation by outlining
case studies of severe neglect); Gardianos, supra note 239, at 208–09 (referring to the case
of People v. Scruggs, in which a mother was convicted on the basis of a risk-to-injury
statute for failing to take action when her son showed signs of severe distress. The high
court in Connecticut reversed the conviction, and the Connecticut Supreme Court found
the statute was unconstitutionally vague). However, even in such a rare case such as
Scruggs, the mother was arguably blameworthy not merely for failing to notice that her son
was in acute distress, but also for actually neglecting him, including an extraordinarily
problematic home environment and severe emotional neglect, that was arguably to blame
for the child’s suicide, at least in part.
242
See Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 533, 535 (2013).
243
See Lisa Gentile, Parental Civil Liability for the Torts of Minors, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 125, 128–32 (2007) (listing parental liability statutes and noting that two
states—Hawaii and Louisiana—have gone further and enacted statutes that impose strict
liability on parents for their children’s torts).
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liability on parents is still very rare,244 and in the case of online
harms, liability is even harder to substantiate because courts examine whether parents had the opportunity and ability to exercise reasonable control over their child’s actions.245 Courts have not found
parents liable when they were not physically present at the scene in
which damage was caused.246
The reluctance to find parents liable has several explanations,
such as the traditional aversion toward government interference in
the family.247 Another concern is that parental tort liability will result in the legal adoption of excessively high parenting standards
that characterize middle-class parents. In a time in which middleclass parenting trends have escalated into helicopter parenting, normalizing such standards could cause injustice toward parents who
cannot live up to these habits or who believe in different styles of
parenting.248
In any case, it is unlikely that parents could be held legally responsible under current laws for harm caused to their children or by
their children through online engagement. Parents would have to be
actively engaged in the online activity to be held responsible for
such harm.249 Although there may be extraordinary cases in which
such circumstances transpire, they are unhelpful for our exploration,
which involves the more typical case in which parents are unaware
of their child’s unhealthy and risky online behavior.
While parents are practically immune from criminal and civil
liability in cases where children are harmed,250 third parties such as
schools and colleges have been found liable by courts for harm
244

See Porter, supra note 242, at 545.
See Gentile, supra note 243, at 126.
246
See Porter, supra note 242, at 561.
247
See Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002) (“[A] legal
system that shows strong deference to parents’ child rearing decisions serves children well.
Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of their
particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue
their children’s best interests in most circumstances. In contrast, the state’s knowledge of
and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin.”).
248
Id. at 636, 673–75.
249
This would include, for example, showing they had an “opportunity for exercising
control” over their children. Porter, supra note 242, at 561.
250
See generally Gardianos, supra note 239; Porter, supra note 242.
245
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caused to children when the school failed to report children’s irregular behavior.251 The duty to report is easily applicable to cases
where a school is aware of a distressed online expression, but may
be impracticable when the concerning online activity is invisible to
school staff.
Still, regulators have managed to make schools partners in promoting the health, development, and protection of children, which
can be applied in the case of algorithmic parenting as well. For example, schools across the country are very much involved in the nationwide struggle against childhood obesity by educating children
on how to maintain a healthy lifestyle and what constitutes nutritious
food.252 Legislators in various states have even gone further, setting
rules limiting snacks, fast food, and soft drinks in school cafeterias
and vending machines.253 Another example is sexual behavior. High
schools engage in an effort to combat unprotected sex by teenagers
and make condoms available in schools—a practice validated by
courts.254
Schools can also promote digital safety. Most schools engage in
some kind of educational work developing digital literacy, online

251

See generally Joy Blanchard, University Tort Liability and Student Suicide: Case
Review and Implications for Practice, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 461 (2007) (summarizing current
case law related to student health and proposing recommendations for parental
notification).
252
See Nutrition Education in US Schools, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyschools/
nutrition/school_nutrition_education.htm [https://perma.cc/C5PM-BMWK] (Feb. 15,
2021) (detailing the different measures incorporated by US schools, including standalone
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See Michele Simon & Ellen J. Fried, State Laws on School Vending: The Need for a
Public Health Approach, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 139 (2007) (discussing rules used to
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regulations when a lawsuit was brought by the National Soft Drink Association (now called
the American Beverage Association). This victory led to the increased availability of fast
food, soft drinks, sugar, etc. in schools and the shift to state or local regulation. For more
information on state and local regulation, see Lindsay F. Wiley, “No Body Left Behind”:
Re-Orienting School-Based Childhood Obesity Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC.
CHANGE 97 (2013); see also Allison Nihiser et al., Preventing Obesity Through Schools,
41 J.L., MED. & ETHICS SUPPLEMENT, Summer 2013, at 27 (2013).
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See Dede Hill, Note, Condom Availability Programs Belong in the Schools, Not in the
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (1996).
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learning strategies, and ethical and safe behavior online.255 We cannot stress enough that these are crucial for maintaining online safety
and psychological well-being, and developing digital social skills.
Schools could also be instrumental in implementing algorithmic parenting by offering free algorithmic monitoring as a default in all the
devices they supply to children. For several years, school boards
around the country have supplied electronic devices to assist and
support learning.256 During the COVID-19 crisis, distribution of
electronic devices to students surged dramatically in an effort to ensure universal access to distance learning.257 It is likely that the use
of electronic devices by students will remain even after health restrictions enable the resumption of in-person learning. When
schools provide devices, they could install the protective component
as a default. Parents receiving these devices could also opt out so
they would not be subject to this measure against their will. But parents would be more likely to use a free, default service.258
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This was stressed as an important goal in a Federal Report on School Safety presented
to the President of the United States in 2018. Although the primary trigger for
commissioning the report was acts of violence such as school shootings, the reports called
more generally for prevention and education on topics of cyberbullying and preventing
exposure to violent and inappropriate content online. See FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY,
FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON SCHOOL SAFETY 23, 65 (Dec. 18, 2018).
256
Benjamin Herold, Technology in Education: An Overview, EDUC. WEEK (Feb. 17,
2016), https://www.edweek.org/technology/technology-in-education-an-overview/2016/
02 [https://perma.cc/XKP3-5Y55] (“Increasingly, schools are moving to provide students
with their own laptop computer, netbook, or digital tablet. Schools purchased more that 23
million devices for classroom use in 2013 and 2014 alone. In recent years iPads and then
Chromebooks (inexpensive Web-based laptops) have emerged as the devices of choice for
many schools.”).
257
See Chicago Schools to Distribute Electronic Devices to Students for Remote
Learning Amid Covid-19 Pandemic, TIMES NW. IND. (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.nwitimes.com/news/chicago-schools-to-distribute-electronic-devices-tostudents-for-remote-learning-amid-covid-19-pandemic/article_ab611ee0-c22c-5b1d9beb-a7c4f8e2a2ad.html [https://perma.cc/MWU9-MW73]; Benjamin Herold, Schools
Handed Out Millions of Digital Devices Under Covid-19. Now, Thousands Are Missing,
EDUC. WEEK (July 23, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/technology/schools-handed-outmillions-of-digital-devices-under-covid-19-now-thousands-are-missing/2020/07
[https://perma.cc/H342-6NMA].
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See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 417 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (stating that people are likely
to remain with default rules even if they are not beneficial for them).
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For many children, devices supplied by schools would not be the
only device they would use.259 This might hinder the algorithmic
oversight’s effectiveness since some online activity would not be
accessible to the algorithm. This problem can be solved by enabling
parents to add additional devices apart from the school’s device
upon registering for the service.
Because schools are an important contact for children and parents, they could be instrumental in ensuring access to algorithmic
parenting. But other governmental units interact with parents periodically and are specifically tasked with promoting children’s wellbeing and protection. Some target specific families in need or crises,260 while others are universal and supply services to all families.261 These governmental units could also be used to promote
online safety, among other things, through algorithmic parenting.
Governmental agencies that target families in need of help and
children in need of protection are especially suitable candidates for
encouraging algorithmic parenting. One such interface is the child
welfare system, which is tasked with the protection and care of children who have been mistreated through various services such as inhome family preservation services, foster care, residential treatment,
mental health care, substance abuse treatment, parenting skills classes, and more.262 As part of these services, professionals could
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A study in 2015 found that three out of four teens have a smartphone, eighty-seven
percent of teens have or have access to a computer, four out of five teens have or have
access to a game console, and more than half of the teens have a tablet. Therefore, most
children, especially older children, have access to at least three different connected devices.
See Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr.
9,
2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/04/09/teens-social-mediatechnology-2015 [https://perma.cc/Y9BF-PXXG].
260
This includes, for example, the Child Welfare System or Family Courts. See infra
notes 265, 267.
261
This includes, for example, public libraries and health care centers.
262
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), originally passed in 1974,
supplies federal funding to states to support prevention, investigation, prosecution, and
treatment. See How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY
(Feb. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cpswork.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2EHG-3KWY]; Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child
Welfare, 92 NEB. L. REV. 897, 899 (2014) (stating that a public health approach to child
welfare would “provide a wider range of interventions to achieve the goal of preventing
future maltreatment more effectively” and through less intrusion into families).
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encourage parents to implement algorithmic parenting. The welfare
system engages with the nation’s most vulnerable children and
youth, who are at especially high risk for those dangers algorithmic
parenting is designed to detect. It would be relatively easy to implement safety measures that could help even those parents struggling
the most to maintain some sort of control over their children’s
safety. Policymakers could issue instructions to the professionals
working with families to encourage its use. Obviously, it would be
crucial to universal accessibility to ensure this service is free or
available at a very low cost.263
Family courts are another point of contact between official state
agencies and families during divorce proceedings. Divorce is a moment of crisis in families’ lives and a time in which both parents and
children may suffer mental health difficulties.264 It is also a moment
in which the law intervenes in decisions that are otherwise parental
prerogatives.265 In the past few decades, several states have passed
laws that require parents to participate in parent education or allow
courts to mandate these programs for parents.266 The goal of these
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See John Guidubaldi & Joseph D. Perry, Divorce and Mental Health Sequelae for
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ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 531, 535 (1985) (stating that in a multifactored mental health
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whose parents were not); Alan Booth & Paul Amato, Divorce and Psychological Stress,
32 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 396, 404 (stating that adults going through divorce showed a
rise in psychological stress in the period of time before and after the divorce).
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See, e.g., Antony Baron Kolenc, When I Do Becomes You Won’t: Preserving the Right
to Home School After Divorce, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 263, 272 (2011) (explaining that
courts make decisions in issues of child rearing because the parents are deadlocked).
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See Solveig Erickson & Nancy Ver Steegh, Mandatory Divorce Education Classes:
What Do the Parents Say?, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 889, 900 (2001); Susan L. Pollet &
Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory Parent Education, 46 Fam. Ct.
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provisions is to improve cooperation between divorced parents and
increase awareness of children’s needs in relation to divorce.267 Although mandatory parent education sessions are focused on other important issues, in times of crisis children’s safety should receive priority; therefore information concerning algorithmic parenting could
be included as an integral part of parent education.
There are several examples of governmental interactions with
parents that could be used to encourage algorithmic parenting. These
include processes in schools for determining eligibility under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),268 contending
with chronic absenteeism,269 and rehabilitating children through the
juvenile criminal justice system,270 to name a few.
However, using the suggested points of contact between parents
and the state to encourage algorithmic parenting may result in disparity along socioeconomic and racial lines. On average, racial minorities and people who live in poverty are more likely to have

Rev. 375, 375 (2008); Peter Salem et al., Taking Stock of Parent Education in the Family
Courts: Envisioning a Public Health Approach, 51 Fam. Ct. Rev. 131, 131 (2013).
267
See Erickson & Ver Steegh, supra note 266, at 900 (“The first purpose [of
Minnesota’s plan] is to educate parents concerning ‘the impact that divorce . . . [can] have
upon children and families.’ The second purpose is to educate parents with respect to
‘methods for preventing parenting time conflicts.’ The third purpose is to educate parents
about dispute resolution options.”).
268
To be eligible for services under the IDEA, children receive an evaluation and an
individualized educational program team is created to build the program, including
deciding which services and accommodations the student needs. Parents have a right to be
present at IEP meetings, as do children beginning at age sixteen. See Andrew M.I. Lee, Ten
Procedural Safeguards in IDEA, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/
articles/en/10-key-procedural-safeguards-in-idea? [https://perma.cc/V4EH-NPQV].
269
See generally LAUREN BAUER ET AL., REDUCING CHRONIC ABSENTEEISM UNDER THE
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (2018) (offering strategies to reduce chronic absenteeism
through implementation of statewide accountability plans under ESSA).
270
Juvenile criminal justice often puts a special emphasis on rehabilitation and therefore
enables special flexibility and discretion in the measures used. Used wisely, algorithmic
parenting could be integrated into the various tools used for empowering parents and
rehabilitating child offenders. For a critical discussion of discretion in juvenile justice, see
generally Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1995) (arguing
that rehabilitation and proportionate retribution define the parameters of legitimate
discretion in juvenile courts).
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repeated interactions with state agencies, such as the welfare system271 and family courts.272 When schools distribute devices according to need, these students are also more likely to receive devices.
This may cause a divide in which algorithmic parenting is applied
more often to children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
On the one hand, this is a desirable outcome. If algorithmic parenting develops into an effective tool for protecting children from
online risks without overly infringing children’s privacy and liberties, we should not be concerned with such overrepresentation. Still,
applying state incentives to algorithmic monitoring in such an unequal manner causes discomfort for several reasons. First, directing
measures at marginalized communities runs the risk of unwanted
and unjustified surveillance. However, this concern would ideally
be offset by the fact that privileged parents, who are already seeking
technological means for promoting online safety, are likely to be
enthusiastic consumers. More importantly, alongside the targeted
interventions detailed above, policymakers could design regulations
that would encourage all families to shift to algorithmic parenting.
Most obviously, regulation could be instrumental in making algorithmic parenting easily accessible to all parents. In addition to
regulating costs, regulations could ensure that information concerning online risks and tools for contending with them are available
online and in printed brochures in schools, daycare centers, medical
centers, public libraries, etc. However, brochures’ effectiveness may
be limited if lost in the abundance of information offered to parents
in such settings.
Parents are more likely to engage in algorithmic parenting if it
is offered a click away, by trusted agencies as a part of their services.
Again, schools are a primary example. Not all schools provide children with devices, but many schools use learning management systems (“LMSs”) for communicating with students, assigning tasks,
271

See Disproportionality and Disparity in Child Welfare, NAT.’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/
disproportionality-and-race-equity-in-child-welfare.aspx [https://perma.cc/AK48-6EEC]
(reporting the racial and ethnic disparity in children protection services).
272
See R. Kelly Raley et al., The Growing Racial and Ethnic Divide in U.S. Marriage
Patterns, 25 FUTURE CHILD., no. 2, at 89, 92 (2015) (stating that divorce rates are higher
for Black women than they are for white women and lowest for Asian women).
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delivering content, and managing students’ activities and achievements.273 When they do, all students enrolled in the school use these
systems. LMSs require opening accounts and creating profiles for
all users, and therefore could be programmed to automatically suggest algorithmic parenting applications, along with a recommendation from educators to use them.
Various other services that most parents consume are increasingly using online communications as well as mobile apps. For example, pediatric health care providers offering services through mobile apps could be instructed to create a default link to algorithmic
parenting solutions.274 Online services offered by public libraries275
are another example of a service that many families access and that
could be instrumental for encouraging parents to consider algorithmic parenting as a parenting tool.
Admittedly, all these measures will be unable to ensure that all
children are protected. However, they can help increase parental
awareness and therefore serve as an important step in the right direction. All in all, as we described in this Part, several legal measures
must be taken into account with the rise of algorithmic parenting.
While generally a desirable outcome, policymakers must not rely
simply on the market or technology to properly advance this new
form of parental monitoring, but instead must apply the suggested
toolkit comprised of legislation and regulation.
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Mobile Applications, 18 CLINICAL J. ONCOLOGY NURSING 634, 634 (2014) (discussing the
various health-related mobile applications and their potential for oncological health care).
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of Social Software Use in Public Libraries, 26 LIBR. HI TECH 411, 413 (2008) (discussing
the challenges and advantages of social software such as blogs, chats, forums, and picturesharing applications for public libraries).
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CONCLUSION
While parents have always been morally and legally responsible
for ensuring the safety of their children, the shift to the digital world
has made things significantly more complicated. Scientists in various fields have studied the changing risks and challenges, some of
which remain unknown. Technology, however, may provide solutions to some of the problems it exacerbates. AI technology could
facilitate the movement toward algorithmic parenting, which has potential to improve children’s online safety and simultaneously safeguard their liberties, privacy, and well-being.
Since many parents are already seeking technological solutions
for online protection, algorithmic parenting could easily become a
new reality in many families. Therefore, the law governing the protection of children’s rights must adjust to contend with its potential
drawbacks. It must ensure that children’s data is sufficiently protected and that this powerful tool is designed in a way that protects
not only children’s safety, but also their liberties, autonomy, and privacy. The law should also ensure that all children in society have
access to algorithmic parenting, including those whose parents are
least equipped to contend with the challenges children face in the
digital world.
At the same time, social scientists must further research and
evaluate the move toward algorithmic parenting and its effects on
parents, children, and their relations. The regulatory regime must be
highly attentive to these studies to ensure that technology is promoting children’s safety, while also improving well-being, supporting
development, and facilitating robust and nurturing parent-child relationships.

